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THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION
OF GOA
BY THE INDIAN UNION

*SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
PROF. DOCTOR OLIVEIRA SALAZAR, DURING THE SESSION
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HELD ON JANUARY 3rd., 1962.*

SECRETARIADO NACIONAL DA INFORMAÇÃO

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SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
PROF. DR. ANTONIO SALAZAR, DURING THE SESSION
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HELD AT LISBON 24th NOV.

Mr. Chairman of the National Assembly

Honourable Members :

It is not my habit to write for History and I regret having to do so today, but the Portuguese Nation has every right to know how and why it has been dispossessed of the Portuguese State of India. For Goa to have been Portuguese for 450 years and now to be occupied by the Indian Union is one of the greatest disasters in our history and a very deep blow suffered by the Nation's moral life. The Portuguese State of India made a very minor contribution to the Portuguese economy or Portuguese political strength ; but for us it counted above all as the landmark of one of the greatest happenings in the history of the world and in communications between the East and the life of the West. It should be a matter of honour and pride for all civilized nations and those which have benefitted from Portuguese action in the world to leave Portuguese India in the care of a small country which made the great discoveries at the cost of tremendous sacrifices. This notion has clashed with the concept of mere expansionist ambition, and this is a further, flagrant proof of the decadence of legality and the depreciation of moral values in our time. Yet this explanation does not satisfy the Portuguese, who may have forgotten that the Indian Union is not susceptible to historical, legal or simply human rea-

sons but who did place their trust in influences able to oppose effectively, in the manoeuvres of world politics, the ambitions to which Goa has fallen a victim. We must thus go deeper into the question and explain in some detail how all this has come about.

I

It would be true to say that the case of Goa began at the moment when the Indian Union became independent. The Indian Empire broke up into various States, a cision which the Indian Union was very reluctant to accept, because it began to consider itself the real successor of Great Britain in the peninsula and fundamentally as the State which sooner or later would incorporate all the others. For the leaders in New Delhi the terms «Indian Union», «India» and «Hindustan» have come to represent in their minds one and the same thing, thus confusing geography with political ambition.

Faithful to this concept the Indian Union took advantage of the confused situation of the first years of its existence to effect a vast plan of unification through agreements, the exertion of pressure and conquest, and controls other territories, for example Kashmir, even in the face of repeated votes and the formal condemnation of the United Nations. Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, is the greatest representative of this imperialistic idea against which all the other ideas he claims to profess, pacifism, non-violence and good neighbourliness, are powerless. He is not perturbed by contradictions, either in thought or in action, which some, moreover, would benevolently attribute to changes in public opinion. He is illogical to a fault, or at least his logic is different from ours. The years he spent in London may have taught him something of European culture but they did not affect his fundamental mentality. He has sought for something to bind together the mosaic of peoples and races that inhabit the sub-continent, to assure their extremely precarious political unity, and he believes that the solution lies in the Hindu substratum. Fundamentally,

however strange it may seem to those who listen to his lectures, the Indian Prime Minister is a racist, prejudiced against the West, a pacifist in theory but an aggressor in practice. Not only in Asia either. He is beset by the problems of excess population and misery and he has plans for an empty Africa where he hopes that the Indian will be able to take the white man's place.

The observer who does not keep these points very clearly in mind will be unable to understand the Indian action which will be taken in the not far distant future in Asia and Africa, or to comprehend what has happened in the case of Goa.

Naturally enough the Portuguese State of India was respected as part of Portugal's sovereignty by the British. A nation like Great Britain could have no interest in incorporating such tiny territories nor could it ever contemplate such an act, having come to India two centuries later than us, but once unscrupulous ambitious men came to power this was no longer the case. The mechanism of unification would continue to function, even to the detriment of sovereign powers outside the British Empire.

The case of Goa underwent successive changes of aspect in the Prime Minister's policy and speeches. To begin with he called for extensive autonomy, which Goa in fact already enjoyed, then for independence and finally for the annexation which was indeed the aim in view. In this process the Indian Union appeared at one point as the holder of the right to protect identical or similar races, wherever they dwelt, then as a great power ardently inspired by the anti-colonialist struggle to free enslaved peoples. The Indians persevered through the years in their campaign against Portugal or against a Portuguese Goa, but they were unable to convince the world that they were right and far less able to prove that we were wrong.

As far as we are concerned, our discovery, the agreements reached with local chiefs, the undisputed possession of centuries, the peace, spiritual cohesion and progress of peoples as a foundation for the legitimacy of our sovereignty cannot be questioned or denied in the western world. But the Indian Union thought quite differently from us in this matter, its view being that the

age of these title deeds and the continued exercise of power were a further reason for their extinction, not for their maintenance.

The accusations against the Portuguese administration, the lack of freedom in Goa, the supposed aspirations of the Goans to separate from the common homeland and the taunt of colonialism were so clearly contrary to visible fact that they could not be seriously supported; they were generally considered to be a mere weapon of political propaganda. Many facts undermine and utterly refute the accusation that the State of India, though dressed out as a province, was in fact no more than a colony: all Goans have always been full Portuguese citizens, they have their own legislative assembly, they have sent representatives to the Portuguese Parliament since 1822, they have risen to the highest posts in the public departments and in the Government and have carried on their professional activities in all Portuguese territories, at home or overseas. The Goans were even more difficult than others to convince of the truth of the charge.

After diplomatic relations had been established between the Indian Union and Portugal, a proposal was made to the Portuguese Government in February 1950 for immediate negotiations on the future of Goa or, more explicitly, for definition of the terms on which the Portuguese State of India would be incorporated into the Indian Union. Unless we would deny ourselves and betray our compatriots we could not negotiate the cession of national territories or the transfer of their inhabitants to foreign sovereign powers. We could only legitimately negotiate the solution of the many problems which arise in the everyday life of neighbour States. We have maintained this attitude since the very outset, but the only form of negotiation which the Indian Union sought and understood was not this, while it put forward one that for us had an impossible objective.

This attitude of ours was the basis for the subsequent measures taken by the Indian Union against Goa and the Goans, to persuade them or to overwhelm them. They form a long list of acts of violence against persons and their property, their beliefs and their lives which in civilized countries spring from a state

of war but in the Indian Union were officially considered manifestations of pacifist policy. It would be impossible to mention them all at this point. I shall merely say that the Portuguese position has at all junctures been not to reply to the offences committed and to try to overcome the difficulties created for us. The purpose of the prohibition of traffic of people and goods by land and sea, the interruption of railway services and of communications, the closing of ports to our ships, the freezing of deposits, the suspension of transfers, the provocations of satyagrahis, the attacks on frontier posts protected by the Indian authorities, terrorist outrages and the activity of subversive agents inside Goa was to render life unsafe or impossible and to make Portugal responsible for the suffering of the inhabitants. The Indian Union had been able to stifle and suppress the French establishments in India but forgot the circumstances that we, with some imagination, goodwill and some resources, made use of to overcome the difficulties. I mean the wide ocean before Goa, Damão and Diu and the air space which could not be disturbed except by express violation.

These elements cast life in the State of India in a new mould. Communications were intensified with Portuguese Africa, Portugal proper and the rest of the world. The land's economy and mining output were developed. The port of Mormugão was fitted out on a scale that has perhaps few equals in Asia, and certainly not in the Indian Union, exports increased and the railway system began to show a profit. Goa was enabled to breathe and live as if the Indian Union did not exist and did not display its constant hostility on her frontiers.

Thus a firm decision was able to parry all the blows and heal all the wounds. Faced with this the Indian policy suffered successive setbacks, which exasperated the mentors of the Prime Minister, who had, in the meantime, allowed the diversion of Dadrá and Nagar-Aveli. There the Indian Union's position was more favourable, that of Goa correspondingly less, for Nagar-Aveli and Dadrá were enclaves completely surrounded by enemy territory and the Indian Government, within its constantly proclaimed

respect for legality and peace, ceased to allow any links with the outside world. Nor did it allow them again, even after the International Court at The Hague had recognized Portugal's rights in its decision of 12 April 1960, which the Indian Union could not ignore. To set the seal on the most absolute disregard of Portuguese sovereignty and contempt for the verdict of the highest international tribunal, the New Delhi Parliament finally approved by a decree the annexation of the two territories.

Our conclusion may justly be that the Indian Union, though abetted by its powerful influence in various forms, was unable to defeat Portugal either in the sphere of facts, the grounds given or in law and before the courts, or even at the highest political levels, as we shall soon see. Its ambitions were opposed by our right, so simple, so clear, so innocent that all were forced to recognize it and many were obliged to recognize its advantages for the inhabitants concerned, at peace among themselves and in the heart of the Portuguese Nation. This was too much for the Indian Union to bear.

The Indian Union could not shake off its obsession with Goa and so, beaten in all spheres, its last resource was to use force. Our only possibility of preventing this eventuality was to force the Indian Union to set in motion a large-scale operation, to the utter detriment of its pacifism and the scandalized astonishment of the world at large. It was long thought in the Union that a sham rising in Goa could serve as a pretext for a mere police intervention which the Prime Minister could then present as a free service rendered to the cause of peace. This notion revealed ignorance of local circumstances: on the one hand, the morale of the population, the absolute non-existence of racial or religious conflicts, the standard of living, modest but still far higher than in the Indian Union, the liberty enjoyed by all in their little country, as they called it, and, finally, the centuries-old union with Portugal, did not tempt them into the adventure of plunging with their interests, their traditions and the nobility of their history into the pandemonium of struggles and misery in the Indian Union. On the other hand the watchfulness of the author-

ities made all the plans miscarry. This method was thus seen to be impracticable, although it was only finally abandoned at the last moment.

II

The question was aggravated by the warlike threats of the Indian Prime Minister and the order given for the mobilization of the Indian military forces. The time had come for us to use the political elements which we believed we could count on for support. This explains our inquiries of the governments of Great Britain, the United States and Brazil.

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Between Portugal and Great Britain there exist old alliances which both governments consider to be still in force. It is not worthwhile mentioning them all here, for the essential elements for my purpose are to be found in the declaration of 14 October 1899, commonly called the Treaty of Windsor. This expressly ratified the validity of art. 1 of the 1642 Treaty and the final article of the 1661 Treaty. The former refers generically to the alliance between the two nations whereas the latter contains the obligation of the British Government to defend Portugal's overseas territories or, in the language of the time, all the conquests and colonies belonging to the Portuguese Crown, against all their present and future enemies.

It has been the view of the two governments that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance is not automatic; its application depends on the *casus foederis*, that is, the opinion formed by each of the States on the war situation and the possibilities of intervention therein. This refers to the alliance as such because the obligation of the British Government to defend the Portuguese overseas territories cannot be legitimately understood by us or by anybody

else to be dependent on the *casus foederis*, since it is expressed in so precise and absolute a manner in the Treaty of 1661. That is, the obligation to defend our overseas territories in a manner suited to the circumstances cannot be omitted.

Yet it would seem that the British interpretation seeks to diverge from this principle in view of the declaration made on 19 May 1958 in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who referred to the form of application of the Treaties to territories and to particular circumstances, without the distinction that I have just made. The very prudent British school of diplomacy has one special feature that I greatly admire, which is to make every effort even in the gravest circumstances to obtain concrete undertakings in exchange for vague promises. In view of this tendency, a mere parliamentary declaration, not the result of an agreement between the two governments, has not seemed to us to be valid as the genuine interpretation of a Treaty which contains, furthermore, an express reference to the advantages which Portugal had yielded in exchange for the obligation accepted by Great Britain. Our interpretation should thus be the better of the two.

In over thirty years of government I had never appealed to the Treaties of alliance, it being my belief that a constant fidelity had transformed them from documents to be invoked and discussed into deep feelings and permanent attitudes in the policy of the two nations. But Great Britain has expressly invoked the alliance. One example is the request for the concession of facilities in the Azores in 1943 in spite of our declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war. The white paper on the Azores published in London in 1946 omitted any reference to the notes of June 16 and 23, September 14 and October 4 of that year, which were precisely those referring to the guarantees given by the British Government on the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in the overseas territories. It is true that while that same most prudent British diplomacy had not limited in time the assurance given, it had indirectly limited it to the threats or risks which might result from the concessions we then made.

In view of the desperate situation in which Great Britain then was, we did not think it appropriate to raise the question at that time and waste time on useless argument, so that I did no more than outline the matter in passing in one of the notes I have mentioned. What is certain is that whatever the circumstantial limitations of the promises made at that point the generic guarantees or, rather, the British undertakings, continued to be without any possible argument those enshrined in the 1661 and 1899 Treaties. We therefore based our request to Great Britain on those two undertakings.

My personal dislike of asking for the services of others, even when they are due by contract, had to give way before the gravity of the cause. What the State of India represented and still represents for the Portuguese Nation cannot be measured by the smallness of its territory but by the greatness of the history of which it forms part and the nobility of the mission which took the Portuguese there in the first place. On the basis of our interpretation of the 1899 Treaty and not forgetting a rather ill-timed and purely unilateral reaction by the British Government in 1954, recently recalled in the House of Lords by the Secretary of State, the Portuguese Government thus asked the British Government on 11 December to indicate what measures it could adopt to cooperate with the Portuguese forces to frustrate the Indian aggression. The reply of Her Majesty's Government was soon received and consisted, in essentials, of the following: in the eventuality of an attack on Goa there would be inevitable limitations on the aid which the British Government would be in a position to give the Portuguese Government in a struggle with another member of the Commonwealth. This euphemistic reference to «inevitable limitations» had to be interpreted in this case as meaning that the British Government was excusing itself from carrying out the obligations of the Treaties.

I am among those who are convinced that the British Government made many more efforts and much more urgent appeals in this emergency to prevent the Indian aggression than those reflected in the press or directly communicated to us. The reason

for this is a simple one. Although Goa could never represent for the British view of such problems what she means to us, an integral portion of the Portuguese Nation, it is extremely disagreeable for the honour and prestige of a great power to avoid fulfilling definite obligations which were duly balanced by benefits conceded by Portugal. We should also consider it intolerable for the upbringing and the individual moral sense of the British for Great Britain to acquire, through the Commonwealth, any piece of territory, however small, stolen from its oldest ally.

But if the «inevitable limitations», now invoked mean that it is impossible for Great Britain to act effectively in the case of armed attacks by members of the Commonwealth on Portuguese territories, there is another aspect of the matter to consider. Given the extension of the Commonwealth and the aggressiveness and expansionist ambitions of its new members, the Portuguese Government should now study what positive content still remains in the second part of the Declaration of Windsor of 1899. On its conclusions it should base its future attitude towards the obligations that exist between the two countries. The pragmatism of British policy is admirable, but unfortunately it cannot always avoid the awkwardness of painful contradictions.

We also asked the British Government for permission to use some aerodromes necessary for connections with Goa. I am sorry to say that the British Government took a week to inform us that we could not use them. Had it not been for this delay we should certainly have found alternative routes and we could have rushed to India reinforcements in men and material which we thought necessary for a longer sustained defence of the territory.

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Now let us consider the United States.

Thanks to the effect of two great victorious wars and their economic and financial power, area and population, the United States were raised to the highest level among the nations and

considered to be the highest expression and leader of what we consider to be the free world. It is of no importance whether they deliberately and intentionally sought to reach this high position or whether they merely raised to it by a series of historical circumstances. What matters to all of us is whether, now that they occupy this position, they are also ready to carry out its inherent functions.

For these reasons and because of the special relations which have been formed between us for the express purpose of defending the principles fundamental to the life of civilized peoples, the Government thought that it would be showing untimely pride if it did not solicit the intervention of the United States. There was another reason, too.

I should here reveal that on 7 August 1961 the United States informed the Portuguese Government of the following: «The support given by the United States to the concept of self-determination does not in any guise imply American support of any interventionist or expansionist aspirations or depredatory attacks on Portuguese overseas territories by other nations. On the contrary, the United States would undoubtedly oppose politically, diplomatically and in the United Nations any attempts by neighbouring states to annex Portuguese overseas territories». On 9 December the Portuguese Government received an explanation of that first attitude — we cannot yet be sure how far it is invalidated by the explanation —, but in spite of this we considered it a very serious matter for the relations and agreements between the two States that the first declaration should not be the expression in words of an established, unconditional policy, the result moreover of a common adhesion to a state of law which constantly opposed the violent use of force in international life. So we got into touch with the American Government.

It was in fact very active both in Washington and in New Delhi in its attempt to dissuade the Indian Union from attacking Goa. It seems that President Kennedy even wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, while the last appeal to dissuade Nehru by the

American Ambassador in New Dehli was made no more than two hours before the order to attack was given.

We cannot doubt the force of these requests and those made by Great Britain, nor the political and ideological interest of the two nations in that the Portuguese State of India should not be invaded so as to be annexed by the Indian Union by an act of war. Both were afraid that the pacifist legend of the Indian Union would finally and completely disappear and also that it would be recognized how fragile and ineffective was the edifice they had so lovingly built and maintained for the preservation of peace. But in that case we must realize that today in India there is a small country deprived of its territories by force, and that at the gates of Goa two great powers, Great Britain and the United States, are also defeated, which predicts a fearful catastrophe for the world. When small nations are defeated it is sad and afflicting, but the powerlessness of the great to defend the right is incomparably graver.

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Let us now turn to our Brazil.

The Treaty of Friendship and Consultation which laid down the basis of the Luso-Brazilian Community did no more than transfer an existing reality to the sphere of law, but only when it was formulated in law could it effectively guide the policy of the two countries between themselves and above all between the Community and the world at large. Its outline, at once extensive and imprecise, may serve as the foundations of an international edifice of the widest significance or be no more than the timid inspiration of sentimental messages. On this basis statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic should in fact construct a Community to the benefit of the two lands, as History created them — two homelands — and as the Portuguese and Brazilians seek to perpetuate them. We for our part shall make every effort in this direction.

Anti-colonialism is a constant feature of Brazilian policy, but another is the refusal to recognize the annexation of territory by force. The former should only concern us to the extent that unawareness of the real nature of the Portuguese overseas provinces might possibly obscure understanding of what is happening there; the latter would always work in our favour in the would-be sujection of Goa to the Indian Union. In spite of certain fluctuations this year in the association of Brazil with the Afro-Asian countries, at least the attitude of its responsible leaders towards India did not need to undergo any alteration, maintaining always its condemnation of any aggression and, consequently, a Brazilian refusal to recognize any annexation which might be the result. Goa has always been a case apart in the Brazilian view.

There was thus no difficulty or resistance to be overcome before Brazil could publicly declare, as it has more than once done, its official view on the imminent or current attacks on the Portuguese State of India. We are sure that this attitude did no more than reflect the general opinion of the Brazilian Nation. The fact that Brazil had agreed to defend Portuguese interests in the Indian Union placed it in a special position to defend the people of Goa against the act of absorption that was being prepared.

The intervention of Brazil, like the others I have enumerated, proved unavailing, as did the requests and inquiries made in New Delhi by Spain, Canada, Australia, West Germany, Argentina, Belgium and Holland, to mention only those of which we have direct knowledge.

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Apart from the three countries I have mentioned, whose political activity was especially justified, the Portuguese Chancellery sought to warn friendly nations in all continents, more as a moral mobilization to defend the right than as an action from which decisive effects were expected. It was not necessary to knock at the doors of some because common principles and identical interests pointed unequivocally to the road to be taken.

It is only just to put Spain in the first place, far in advance of all others, for itself and together with its friends in South America, as worthy of our gratitude. It has accompanied us in living the drama of Goa, and rightly so, for if there is a Portuguese territory which has been formed under the joint influence of the two peninsular States it is Goa, which owes as much to the genius of Afonso de Albuquerque as to the teaching of St. Francis Xavier. Furthermore, in a Europe which is in danger of collapse because it has lost its self-confidence Spain has tempered in the fire of a painful experience its faith in the principles of the civilization it spread over the world, and is a nation where the great and the heroic still find their place in life and have a moral sense. Spain thoroughly understands the Portuguese state of mind in all its aspects.

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The means of the nations taken individually to check Indian aggression were exhausted and recourse could now only be had to the action of the world organization, called the «United Nations», through a call for the urgent meeting of the Security Council. Our study of the problem and the experience we are acquiring of the system adopted did not leave us with any doubts about how futile our appeal was. But, on the one hand, our presence in the organization could hardly be understood if we were not ready to have recourse to it; on the other, the way in which it was bound to act would be one further revealing proof that, as it at present functions, it is not only useless but is actively harmful.

The question was put before the Council on the first day of the invasion of Goa and soon after it had begun. It was a case of unprovoked aggression on territory still not occupied by the enemy, in fact an extraordinarily simple case for the application of the principles embodied in the Charter. The motion which ordered a suspension of hostilities was approved by a majority

of seven votes, calling on the invading forces to retire to their initial positions and calling for negotiations for the solution of the conflict. It was nevertheless vetoed by Russia and was thus nullified. The naturally parallel attitudes of the President of the U. S. S. R., who in New Delhi had incited India to invade Goa, and the Russian representative in the Security Council who vetoed the motion approved by a majority, once more drove the Indian Union into the arms of the Soviets, but also clearly showed the paralysis of the so-called collective defence system against Russia or against any power protected by her.

The outcome of the appeal was foreseen but it alarmed the world. The declaration made by the Indian representative that his country would go on with its policy, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council, legitimately or not, was such a challenge to the aims and legal structure of the institution that it would have been better to consider it defunct on the spot. The United States believed that in fact what had happened foretold the impending end of the organization but, in an attempt to consolidate it, they joined all the other nations the next day in a vote against Portugal and two days later hastened to assure the Indian Union of their financial support. This is no doubt correct but it is very difficult for us to understand; above all it does not fit into the pattern of our moral sensitivity.

We might licitly ask what our rôle is in the United Nations, or that of those minor powers who do not enjoy the favour of Russia or whose solidarity with the West calls down upon them the open hostility of the anti-western bloc. The question will also be asked how we came to enter the organization.

The Government's policy followed that of very wise Switzerland, that is, not to seek admission to the United Nations Organization. We did so later at the request of Great Britain and the United States, who argued that it was necessary to reinforce the western position for any emergency. For years we ran up against the Russian veto and we finally entered the organization as «small change». With the transfer of powers from the Council to the Assembly, the first dominated by Russia and the second by the

communists and Afro-Asian countries, the western powers, in which I include South America, lost every possibility of employing their wider experience in conducting the affairs of the international community, moderating certain unthinking impulses and preventing the government of the world from domination by an intolerable dictatorship of racist passions and irresponsibility.

We thus believe we have a right to hear whether our presence and our collaboration are already useless. Even if we do not, I do not yet know whether we shall be the first country to abandon the United Nations, but we shall surely be among the first. Meanwhile we shall refuse them our collaboration in everything that is not in our direct interest.

III

The Government's military policy regarding the problem of Goa has always been based on the following elements: in view of the distance and the overwhelming superiority of the Indian Union we could cherish no hopes of saving Goa from any enemy invasion without the aid of allies; there was the need to maintain sufficient forces to prevent a so-called police action and, if possible, to dissuade the Union from attacking; in the last analysis, we had to defend that sacred portion of national territory with the sacrifice of lives and possessions as the Portuguese tradition in India demanded.

We have kept up this effort, with larger or smaller forces at various periods, according to the seriousness of the threat, but always at a level sufficient to attain our objective of leading the Indian Union either to give up its idea of absorbing Goa or to mount a spectacular war operation which would grievously harm its moral credit and would bring its army neither honour nor glory. Our forces were also to gain enough time for Portugal to protest to the United Nations against the Indian aggression.

A handful of men, 3,500 officers, sergeants and soldiers from Portugal proper and 900 Indo-Portuguese, forced the Indian

Union to mobilize an army of between thirty and forty thousand men, supported by numerous formations of heavy artillery and armoured vehicles, aided in their attack by various squadrons of bombers and fighters and a naval flotilla. Even with a superiority in men of at least ten to one and a far greater material advantage, the occupation of about 3,500 square kilometres, dispersed among four territories and no deeper than thirty miles in the district of Goa, took several days. This fact alone characterizes the firm resistance that the Portuguese must have put up. My greatest concern was that the disproportion of forces and the violence and plan of attack might be so great that our forces, in view of the narrowness of the ground, might not even be able to fight suitably and defend that Portuguese land on a par with their merit and spirit of sacrifice.

In my last message to the Governor-General, written with Heaven knows what agony in my soul, I said that we were quite aware of the modest size of our forces but that since the Indian Union could at will multiply its attacking forces there would inevitably, in the last resort, be a great disproportion between the two sides. Given the impossibility of assuring by its own means a fully effective defence, the Government had always adopted the policy of maintaining such forces in Goa as would oblige the Union, as was visible at that point, to set on foot a large military operation which would shock the world and would prevent it from entrusting the success of its ambitions to mere police action. The facts showed that the first mission had been fulfilled. The second mission was not to disperse our energies against terrorist agents masquerading as liberators, but to organize the defence in a way that would best stress the value of our men, according to the old tradition of India. For me it was horrible to think that this might mean a total sacrifice but I recommended and expected it as the best service that could be rendered to the future of the Nation.

The Governor had time to reply and to thank us, on behalf of the forces under his orders, for the confidence we were placing in them, which they would wish to honour through all sacrifices.

We do not possess enough information to enlighten us on the way in which the land and sea operation went on, how resistance was maintained, how the defence was assured. In due course the country will be informed in detail about these operations and due tribute will be paid to those who were honoured by being called to fight or die for Goa.

IV

The warlike preparations of the Indian Union and its subsequent aggression against the Portuguese State of India called forth a violent reaction on the part of world public opinion. We should exclude from this statement the official informers and press of some communist and Afro-Asian countries which manifested their approval and solidarity with the aggressor. In the countries of Western Europe, the two Americas and even in some African and Eastern countries sharp indignation and great concern were shown. Press organs of all shades of opinion, whether represented in their respective governments or not, have discussed the matter independently of the official policy of the countries concerned, sometimes in opposition to it as the free expression of a worried public opinion. Why? Because Goa is a typical case which showed no complications or difficulties of interpretation. It was a question in fact of a small territory which had been politically incorporated for four and a half centuries in Portuguese sovereignty, recognized as such by the international community and even by the aggressor. Everybody thought it protected by a decision, favourable to Portugal, given by the Hague Court, the competence of which had been accepted by the two States concerned. It possessed the guarantee of long established alliances and undertakings. It should have been able to consider itself protected by the machinery of collective security through the United Nations. And in this case, politically and legally crystal-clear, which was never a problem and never would be, the world saw that everything had been tried, in vain, to avoid an act of aggression and prevent a conquest. Either this situation is reme-

died and healed or Goa will turn over a leaf in the life or the societies of our time.

Thus a general problem was posed.

In the world there are no more than three or four, or at most half a dozen, nations which do not fear, or do not need to fear, attack by other powers. All the rest, however, either live by unanimous agreement that their independence and integrity will be respected or they are at the mercy of more ambitious and stronger nations. The difficulty and the danger can only be avoided by the classical method of alliances which set up systems of balanced forces, or by some organization which seeks to include all peace-loving nations. In the first case, however, the Treaties must be fulfilled as an essential condition; in the second fidelity to Pacts must be maintained, but the moral crisis in which we find ourselves does not assure us of either.

In the most favourable hypothesis the United Nations are centuries ahead of the minds of men and of societies; moreover they have allowed themselves to be invaded by a clamorous multitude of States which have no spirit of peace, so that not merely has it been difficult to defend the rights of Nations within the organization but parties and alliances of interests have been formed there to substitute old alliances and pacts and to further the interests of each group with scant attention to the justice due to all. When the notion disappears that to preserve the peace we must be ready to fight for it; when the fate of the international community is entrusted to majorities which define the policy which the others must pay for and must suffer its consequences; when it becomes a system to compromise and to withdraw before those who have neither experience nor responsibilities and so can be daring with impunity and revolutionize whole continents, then we must seriously ask ourselves whether we are taking the right road. What has just happened to us does in fact justify the anxiety of consciences and the concern of the more healthy societies. The man in the street cannot rise to the high congeminations of philosophers and politicians, but his ambition is to earn his living and maintain his home in peace and he sees the problem with the

simplicity of common sense, which tells him that things are seriously wrong when criminals become judges and even dare to condemn the innocent and the law-abiding.

It is in this awakening of the world conscience, faced with the unholy alliances engaged in destroying the peace and others' sovereignty that we catch sight of a gleam of hope in the shape of a revision, before it is too late, of the methods used in conducting the international community. Before it is too late, I repeat, because we can now see that when an act of violence is not atoned for it gives rise to greater violence still. And this is the basis of my final reflections.

V

Since we do not accept the validity of the «fait accompli» the Goa question has still not ended, and we might truthfully say that it is only just beginning. The reasons which prevented us from negotiating the cession of the territories of the Portuguese State of India are the same that absolutely forbid us to recognize the act of their conquest. The Indian Union has been able to wage war on us but without us it cannot make the peace. In the same way that there has been no surrender of forces or handing over of ships there cannot be any treaty to recognize the sovereignty of the Indian Union over those territories. We shall have to wait for the international community to redress the offence done to Portuguese sovereignty and restore it to its legitimate rights before a normal situation can be re-established. That is why a Bill is to be submitted to the National Assembly to assure the functioning of the organs of Government of the Province of India in the present circumstances.

The first consequence of this is that the parliamentary representation of the State of India will continue to be held by those elected by the people of Goa, Damão and Diu. The House will not object to this in the present parliament and in future a means will be found of giving a practicable right of choice to

those Goans who live outside the territories occupied by the Union and who maintain their devotion to the Portuguese Homeland. Everywhere they have shown themselves to be as genuinely Portuguese as the best of us and have undergone enormous difficulties to maintain their fidelity, and it is no more than an obligation on our part to recognize a right which honours them and assures their presence among us.

The second consequence is that Portuguese citizenship should continue to be recognized in law and in fact to Goans, whether or not they are given a double nationality by the unilateral imposition of the Indian Union. We cannot forecast what will be the procedure of the Union as regards this and many other questions which will arise from the de facto occupation of the Portuguese territories. It is quite likely that at first the occupying authorities will adopt a policy of allurement and ingratiation. Difficulties will arise for both sides when the programme of the indianization of Goa begins to clash with the Goans' culture and when the Prime Minister discovers that a definite individuality has been formed there down the centuries by inter-penetration of cultures and by the crossing of various races. I believe that violence will be exerted in direct proportion to the difficulties which make themselves felt and that if the reintegration of Goa is not effected soon spoliation and forced equality in poverty will be followed by a loss of liberty which will lessen the Goans in their language, their religion and their culture. It is therefore to be expected that many will wish to escape from the inevitable consequences of the invasion, and all will be made welcome at any point of national territory.

We should cherish no illusions on the obstacles and difficulties of all kinds which will beset our programme for the Goans who live outside Portuguese territories. The pertinacity and rage with which the Indian Union has sought to captivate Goans on its territory since it became independent will increase towards those who live in foreign lands, where our action may well be hampered by the Union's influence. But it is our duty to fight for the Goans and for Goa without thought of sacrifice, as we have done so far.

I should like to put one further question: in view of the facts is it not licit to doubt the merit of the paths which our policy towards the Indian Union over Goa has taken? I would reply with another question: what results would the other solutions open to us have brought? Negotiation, cession; independence and the loss of the little State with its subsequent integration; the constitution of a federation with the independent State of Goa would bring the question back to its beginning, because this formula would be considered as a continuation of our colonialism in India. In either case there would be irreparable, hopeless loss. We must continue to wait.

From the reactions which have been manifested throughout the Portuguese world and in all countries where there live groups of Portuguese we may conclude that their feelings did not call for false negotiations to cover up our deprivation but the affirmation of our right, denunciation of the act of aggression and a struggle in all spheres to have it recognized as such. The national feeling on the matter has been so vibrantly stressed through all our means of information that it would not be licit to ignore it and it would be unpardonable to doubt its genuineness. The whole Nation feels in its flesh and in its spirit the tragedy that we have experienced and that it should live on in its heart is a small consolation, but consolation nevertheless, for those of us who would wish to die with it.

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