

See
Stœkdale J. J.

A
NARRATIVE
OF THE
CAMPAIGN,
WHICH PRECEDED
THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA,
IN
Portugal,
&c.

Duplicate

A
NARRATIVE
OF THE
CAMPAIGN,
WHICH TERMINATED
THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA,
IN
1808.

158201 *Mayer Museum*

A
NARRATIVE

OF THE
CAMPAIGN,

WHICH PRECEDED THE
CONVENTION OF CINTRA,

IN
Portugal:

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED
THE REPORT FROM THE BOARD OF ENQUIRY
TO THE KING.

COPIED FROM "THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE ENQUIRY
BY JOHN JOSEPH STOCKDALE."

ILLUSTRATED WITH MILITARY PLANS.

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ARRATIVE

OF THE

CAMPAIGN

WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE

CONVENTION OF GENTRAL

Journal

TO THE

THE REPORT FROM THE BOARD OF ENQUIRY

IN THE

OF THE

BY JOHN JOSEPH STOCK

ILLUSTRATED WITH

ADDENDUM

PRINTED FOR

NO. 4

Printed by S. Gosnell,
Little Queen Street, Holborn.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS brief but interesting sketch of the late operations in Portugal, read to the Board of Enquiry at Chelsea, is copied from the Editor's own account of the Proceedings. He presumes to think his account, the most correct of any, hitherto, laid before the Public; and he, under that impression, takes the liberty to recommend it, accordingly.

He had motives beyond those of mere curiosity to induce particular attention to this part of the Proceedings, and he, consequently, succeeded in making a, nearly, verbatim minute of it.

As the Report of the Board contains an abstract of the Proceedings, he has annexed that Report, conceiving that it might be acceptable to many who would not wish for the more voluminous publication. Those, however, who desire further details will find them in the edition of "The Proceedings of the Board of Enquiry," above-mentioned.

J. J. S.

*No. 41, Pall Mall,
2d January 1809.*

ADVERTISMENT


LIST OF PLANS.

1. A general Plan of the Operations of the Armies.
2. Do. taken on the Scenes of Action.
3. Attack on Zambuiera.
4. Battle of Vimiera.
5. Do. taken on the Field.



EXPLANATION

- A Position of the British near Caldas
- B " " " " French
- C Position of the British near Vimieira
- D " " " " French






 Plan
 of
the Operations
 near
VIMIERA.



- □ French Columns advancing
- Position of the Army in its Encampment
- Position of the Corps engaged during the Action
- A M. Gen. Piqueron 36th 40th 71st
- B B. Gen. Nightingall 8th 2nd
- C B. Gen. Fane 60th 50th 85th
- D B. Gen. Anstruther & Bⁿ 9th 43rd 52nd 97th
- E Cavalry 20 Dragoons
- F B. Gen. Crauford 45th 94th
- G Portuguese Troops
- H Gen. Howe 6th 32nd 29th
- I B. Gen. Adland 2nd 20th 25th
- K M. Gen. Hill 5th 9th 38th


Scale 1/4 of an Inch to a Mile







SKETCH
of the Attack upon the
French Position at
ZAMBUERA,
by the Army under
the Command of
L^{ieut}. Gen^l. the Right Hon.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY & C.
17 Aug^r. 1808.






SKETCH
 of
 the Action between the
 BRITISH & FRENCH
 Forces
 at
 Vimiera in Portugal
 Aug^r 21^o 1808.

One Mile.



GENERAL PLAN
of the
Operations of the British Forces,
in PORTUGAL,
Under Gen. Sir A. Wellesley K.B.
1808.





Reference to the Plan of the Attack on Zambuíera.

- A. The Enemy's first Position.
- B. The Enemy's second Position.
- C. Route of Generals Ferguson's and Bowes's Brigades.
- D. Route of the Portuguese Troops.
- E. Route of General Hill's Brigade, and Cavalry.
- F. Route of General Nightingale's Brigade.
- G. Route of General Fane's, the Light, Brigade.
- H. Route of General Craufurd's, in reserve.
- K. The Enemy's third Position.
- L. General Nightingale's Brigade, advancing in line.
- M. The 29th Regiment, carrying the heights in column.
- N. The 45th Regiment, led by General Spencer, advancing, against the heights, in line.
- O.O.O. Position of the Troops after carrying the heights.
- P. Advance of the Enemy three times to regain their position.
- Q. Position of the army on the night of the 17th of August.
- R. Road by which the Enemy retired.
- S. Steep Rock, whence Sir Arthur Wellesley reconnoitred the Enemy.
- T. High Road to Lisbon.
- V. Water Course.

Quarter-Master-General's Office.

Reference to the Sketch of the Battle of the 21st of August, 1808, between the British and French Forces, near Vimiera, in Portugal.

No. of Regiments.	Generals Commanding.
36th, 40th, 71st,	1. General Ferguson's Position.
6th, 32d,	2. ——— Bowes.
29th, 82d,	3. ——— Nightingale.
2d, 20th, 95th,	4. ——— Acland.
45th, 91st,	5. ——— Craufurd.
9th, 38th, 5th,	6. ——— Hill.
20th Dragoons, and Portuguese,	7. Cavalry.
43d, 52d, 9th, 97th,	8. General Anstruther.
50th, 60th, 95th,	9. ——— Fane.
1200 Infantry,	10. Portuguese.

A.B.C. Position of the Troops at the time of the Attack on the Centre and Left.

- A. General Craufurd and Portuguese, 45th, 91st.
 - B. General Ferguson, 36th, 40th, 71st.
 - C. General Nightingale, 82d.
 - D. General Acland, 2d, 20th, 95th, having moved on his march towards the flank of the Attack on the Centre.
 - E. General Bowes, 6th, 32d, 29th.
 - F. General Fane, 60th, 50th, 95th.
 - G. General Anstruther, (2 battalions) 9th, 43d, 52d, 97th.
 - H. Cavalry, 20th Dragoons.
 - I. General Hill, 5th, 9th, 38th.
 - K. Guns flanking the French Columns.
 - a.a.a. The farthest advance of General Ferguson.
 - b.b.b. Ditto of General Craufurd.
- Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, Camp previous to the Attack.

Quarter-Master-General's Office, Sept. 5, 1808.

Explanation relating to the Battle of the 21st of August, between the British, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the French Forces, under General Junot :

Brigadier-General Anstruther's brigade, and that of Brigadier-General Fane, occupied a detached height in front of the village of Vimiera, in which Sir Arthur Wellesley's head-quarters were. The body of the army was upon a commanding hill, about a cannon shot farther back, towards the sea, having its left at the ravine, in which the rivulet runs, the mouth of which affords a communication with our shipping; the right was thrown back a little, en potence, towards the coast, with which our general line of front was nearly parallel. On the opposite side of the ravine, to our left, the ground rises gradually to the north for about two miles, which look towards Peniche.

The enemy formed two attacks: the one against the left and centre of the height in front of Vimiera, the other conducted from the heights that look towards Peniche, down the long slope, terminating at the ravine on our left, somewhat in the rear of the village of Vimiera. Their attack on our advanced corps took place first, and was repulsed; indeed a considerable time before the action commenced upon the left. As the movements of the enemy in that direction were observed in the morning, Sir Arthur Wellesley had ordered the troops destined to act on that side,

to move out of their original position, to meet the enemy: they were engaged when they had advanced about one-third of the way from the summit of the long sloping heights already described, continued to drive them to the top of it, and down thence into the low grounds beyond; the British line halting upon the summit. The troops engaged in this quarter were the brigades of Generals Ferguson and Nightingale, that of General Acland supporting them. Their movement was perpendicular to the line of the coast, between which and their left, General Craufurd's brigade, and a corps of Portuguese advanced at the same time; but as these troops were somewhat farther back, and the French did not extend their right to the sea, they were not engaged. The advanced corps had orders to maintain its ground, which it did with the greatest bravery, repulsing the attacks made upon it, with a very heavy loss to the enemy of men, and of several guns.

On the left the advance of the troops was firm and regular, driving the enemy from superior ground. The French lost all the artillery they had with the column that attended them on that side. They made some spirited attempts to recover the guns they were driven from, but which failed to make any impression upon our men. No attack was made against the right flank of the position, which was occupied by General Hill's brigade.

Our small body of dragoons pursued the enemy, on their being repulsed from the attack on our advanced posts, but their eagerness carried them a little too far. The superior cavalry of the French made no very decided efforts during the action, but seemed to content themselves with covering the rear of their two columns when driven back. It must be allowed, however, that the ground admitted of cavalry acting only in particular parts. Many of the slopes are extremely abrupt, and several of them covered with vines, and there are also many patches of wood.

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, dated head-quarters at Caldas, Aug. 16, 1808.

I marched from Lyria on the 13th, and arrived at Ahobaca on the 19th, which place the enemy had abandoned in the preceding night; and I arrived here yesterday. The enemy, about 4000 in number, were posted about ten miles from hence, at Borica; and they occupied Brilos, about three miles from hence, with their advanced posts. As the possession of this last village was important to our future operations, I determined to occupy it; and as soon as the British infantry arrived upon

the ground, I directed that it might be occupied by a detachment, consisting of four companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th regiments.—The enemy, consisting of a small picquet of infantry and a few cavalry, made a trifling resistance and retired; but they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to the distance of three miles from Brilos. The riflemen were then attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to their support; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both the flanks of the detachment, and it was with difficulty that Major-General Spencer, who had gone out to *Œbidos* when he had heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village. They have since remained in possession of it, and the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood. In this little affair of the advanced posts, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, I am concerned to add, that Lieutenant Bunbury, of the 2d battalion of the 95th, was killed; and the Hon. Captain Pakenham wounded, but slightly; and we have lost some men, of whose number I have not received the returns.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of *Lourinha*,
August 15, 1808.

5th batt. 60th foot—1 rank and file, killed; 5 rank and file, wounded; 17 rank and file, missing. 2d batt. 95th foot—4 rank and file, missing. Officers killed and wounded—95th foot—Lieut. Bunbury, killed; Capt. the Hon. H. K. Pakenham, wounded. G. B. TUCKER, D.A.G.

Head-quarters at *Villa Verde*, Aug. 17, 1808.

MY LORD,—The French General Laborde having continued in his position at *Roleia* since my arrival at *Caldas* on the 15th instant, I determined to attack him in it this morning. *Roleia* is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at *Caldas*, and is closed to the southward by mountains, which join the hills forming the valley on the left, looking from *Caldas*. In the centre of the valley, and about eight miles from *Roleia*, is the town and old Moorish fort of *Œbidos*, from whence the enemy's picquets had been driven on the 15th, and from that time he had posts on the hills on both sides of the valley, as well as in the plain in the front of his army, which was posted on the heights in front of *Roleia*, its right resting upon the hills, its left upon the eminence, on which was a windmill, and the whole covering four or five passes into the mountains in his rear. I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at least six thousand men, of

which about five hundred were cavalry, with five pieces of cannon; and there was some reason to believe that General Loison, who was at Rio Major yesterday, would join General Laborde by his right in the course of the night. The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army having broken up at Caldas this morning, was formed into three columns; the right, consisting of twelve hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Portuguese cavalry, destined to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear; the left, consisting of Major-General Ferguson's and Brigadier-Gen. Bowes's brigades of infantry, three companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and twenty British and twenty Portuguese cavalry, was destined, under the command of Maj. Gen. Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Cebidos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Roleia; this corps was also destined to watch the motions of General Loison, on the enemy's right, who I had heard had moved from Rio Major towards Alceentre last night. The centre column, consisting of Major-General Hill's, Brigadier-General Nightingale's, Brigadier-General Craufurd's, and Brigadier-General Fane's brigades, (with the exception of the riflemen detached with Major-General Ferguson,) and four hundred Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portuguese cavalry, a brigade of nine-pounders, and a brigade of six-pounders, were destined to attack General Laborde's position in front. The columns being formed, the troops moved from Cebidos about seven o'clock in the morning. Brigadier-General Fane's riflemen were immediately detached into the hills on the left of the valley, to keep up the communication between the centre and the left columns, and to protect the march of the former along the valley; and the enemy's posts were successively driven in. Major-General Hill's brigade, formed in three columns of battalions, moved on the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to attack the enemy's left; and Brigadier-Generals Nightingale and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the high road, until at length the former formed in the plain immediately in the enemy's front, supported by the light infantry companies, and the 45th regiment of Brigadier-General Craufurd's brigade, while the two other regiments of this brigade (the 50th and 91st,) and half of the 9-pounder brigade, were kept as a reserve in the rear. Major-General Hill and Brigadier-General Nightingale advanced upon the enemy's position, and, at the same moment, Brigadier-General Fane's riflemen were in the hills on his right; the Portuguese infantry in a village upon the left; and Major-General Ferguson's column was descending from the heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and greatest celerity; and notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British

infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry, was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain. It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack the formidable position which he had taken up. Brigadier-General Fane's riflemen were already in the mountains on his right, and no time was lost in attacking the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to defeat the enemy completely. The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass on the right of the whole; the light companies of Maj. Gen. Hill's brigade and the 5th regiment moved up a pass next on the right; and the 29th regiment, supported by the 9th, under Brigadier-Gen. Nightingale, a third pass; and the 45th and 82d regiments, passes on the left. These passes were all difficult of access, and some of them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that which was attacked by the 29th and 9th regiments. These regiments attacked with the greatest impetuosity, and reached the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on their flanks: the defence of the enemy was desperate, and it was in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, who distinguished himself upon this occasion. The enemy was, however, driven from all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th regiments alone were advanced to this point, with Brigadier-General Fane's riflemen at a distance on the left, and they were afterwards supported by the 5th regiment, and by the light companies of Major-General Hill's brigade, which had come up on the right; and by the other troops ordered to ascend the mountains, who came up by degrees. The enemy here made three most gallant attacks upon the 29th and 9th regiments, supported, as I have above stated, with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army; in all of which he was, however, repulsed; but he succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing, principally, to my want of cavalry, and secondly, to the difficulty of bringing up the passes of the mountains with celerity, a sufficient number of troops, and of cannon, to support those which had first ascended. The loss of the enemy has, however, been very great: and he left three pieces of cannon in our hands. I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formidable, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of Major-General Hill's brigade,

being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy ;—their conduct, therefore, deserves the highest commendation. I cannot avoid to take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgments for the aid and support I received from all the general and other officers of this army. I am particularly indebted to Major-General Spencer for the advice and assistance I received from him ;—to Major-General Ferguson, for the manner in which he led the light column, and to Major-General Hill and Brigadier Generals Nighingale and Fane, for the manner in which they conducted the different attacks which they led. I derived most material assistance also from Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker and Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst in the offices of Deputy-Adjutant and Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, and from the officers of the staff employed under them. I must also mention that I had every reason to be satisfied with the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Robe. I have the honour to inclose herewith a return of killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Total Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Lieut. Gen. the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. on the 17th of August, 1808.

1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 captains, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 63 rank and file, 1 horse, killed ; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 6 captains, 8 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 20 serjeants, 295 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded ; 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 68 rank and file, missing.

Names of officers killed, wounded, and missing, on the 17th Aug. 1808.

General Staff—captain K. J. Bradford, 3d regiment of Foot Guards, deputy assistant adjutant-general, killed. Royal Artillery—capt. H. Geary, killed. Royal Engineers—capt. H. Elphinstone, badly wounded. 5th Foot—major Emes, slightly wounded ; lieutenant Doyle, wounded. 9th Foot—lieutenant-colonel Stuart, severely wounded ; maj. Molle, capt. Sankey, ensign Nichols, wounded. 29th Foot—lieut. col. the hon. G. A. F. Lake, killed ; majors G. Way, and T. Egerson, wounded ; captains P. Hodge, and A. Patison, wounded ; lieutenants R. Birmingham, St. John W. Lucas, and Robert Stannus, wounded ; captain Geo. Todd, missing ; lieutenants W. Birmingham, Ambrose Newbold, and Thomas Langton, missing. 6th Foot—captain John Currey, slightly wounded. 45th Foot—ensign Dawson, killed ; lieut. Barke, slightly wounded. 82d Foot—lieut. R. Reid, dangerously wounded. 60th Foot—lieut. Kiety, slightly wounded ; ensign Fawes, slightly wounded ; adjutant De Gilse, slightly wounded. 95th Foot—captain Creagh, slightly wounded ; lieutenants Hill and Cortman, slightly wounded.

Total officers, non-commissioned officers, rank and file, horses, killed, wounded, and missing, 482.

G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Gen.

Head Quarters at Lourinha, August 18, 1808.

MY LORD,—Since I wrote to you last night, I have heard from Brigadier-General Anstruther, that he is on the coast of Piniche, with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships, in charge of Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, with a part of the force detached from England under Brigadier-General Acland, in consequence of the receipt of orders which I had left at Modego Bay for General Acland, which he had opened. I have ordered Brigadier-General Anstruther to land immediately, and I have moved to this place, in order to protect his landing, and facilitate his junction. General Loison joined General Laborde in the course of last night at Torres Vedras; and I understand that both began their march towards Lisbon this morning: I also hear that General Junot has arrived this day at Torres Vedras, with a small corps from Lisbon; and I conclude that the whole of the French army will be assembled between Torres Vedras and the capital in the course of a few days,

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Vimiera, August 21, 1808.

SIR,—I have the honour to report to you, that the enemy attacked us in our position at Vimiera this morning. The village of Vimiera stands in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back, and at the westward and northward of this village, is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha and the northward, to Vimiera. The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 8th brigades, were posted on this mountain, with eight pieces of artillery; Major-General Hill's brigade being on the right, Major-General Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights separated from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of the town is a hill which is entirely commanded, particularly on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, on which Brigadier-General Fane was posted with his riflemen and the 50th regiment, and Brigadier-General Anstruther, with his brigade, with half a brigade of six-pounders, which had been ordered to the position in the course of the night. The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a picquet, as the camp had been

taken up only for one night; and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood; both flanking and supporting Brigadier-General Fane's advanced guard. The enemy first appeared at eight o'clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left, upon the heights on the road to Lourinha; and it was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard, and the left of our position; and Major-General Ferguson's brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights, on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of cannon; he was followed successively by Brigadier-General Nightingale with his brigade, and three pieces of cannon; Brigadier-General Acland with his brigade; and Brigadier-General Bowes with his brigade. These troops were formed (Major-General Ferguson's brigade in the first line; Brigadier-General Nightingale's in the second; and Brigadier-Generals Bowes's and Acland's, in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right-upon the valley which leads into Vimiera; and their left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing-place at Maceira. On these last mentioned heights the Portuguese troops which had been in the bottom near Vimiera, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by Brigadier-General Cranford's brigade. The troops of the advanced guard on the height to the southward and eastward of the town, were deemed sufficient for its defence, and Major-General Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain on which the great body of the infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army. In addition to this support these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right. The enemy's attack began in several columns upon the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen, close to the 50th regiment, and were checked and driven back only by the bayonets of that corps. The second battalion, 43d regiment, was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimiera; a part of that corps having been ordered into the church-yard to prevent them from penetrating into the town.

On the right of the position they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regiment, which corps was successfully supported by the 2d battalion, 52d regiment, which by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank. Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on our advanced guard by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by Brigadier-General Acland's brigade, in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the ene-

my's columns by the artillery on those heights. At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of officers and soldiers killed and wounded. He was pursued by the detachment of the 20th light dragoons, but the enemy's cavalry were so much superior in numbers that this detachment has suffered much, and lieutenant-colonel Taylor was unfortunately killed. Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced upon the heights on the road to Lourinha. This attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of the French troops. It was received with steadiness by Major-General Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments; and these corps charged as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him supported by the 82d, one of the corps of Brigadier-General Nightingale's brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line; by the 29th regiment, and by Brigadier-General Bowes's and Acland's brigades, while Brigadier-General Craufurd's brigade, and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left. In the advance of Major-General Ferguson's brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded. The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regiments, which were halted in a valley, in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley, to the heights, where they halted, faced about, fired, and advanced upon the enemy, who had by that time arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged them again to retire with great loss. In this action, in which the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed, under the command of the Duke D'Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost thirteen pieces of cannon, twenty-three ammunition waggons, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and twenty thousand rounds of musket ammunition. One general officer (Beniere) has been wounded, and taken prisoner, and a great many officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken. The valour and discipline of his majesty's troops have been conspicuous upon this occasion, as you, who witnessed the greatest part of the action, must have observed; but it is a justice to the following corps, to draw your notice to them in a particular manner, viz.—the royal artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robe; the 20th dragoons, which had

been commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor; the 50th regiment, commanded by Colonel Walker; the 2d battalion, 95th foot, commanded by Major Travers; the 5th battalion, 60th regiment, commanded by Major Davy; the 2d battalion, 43d, commanded by Major Hull; the 2d battalion, 52d, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ross; the 97th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon; the 36th regiment, commanded by Colonel Burne; the 40th, commanded by Colonel Kemmis; the 71st, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pack; and the 82d regiment, commanded by Major Eyre. In mentioning Colonel Burne, and the 36th regiment, to you upon this occasion, I cannot avoid to add, that the regular and orderly conduct of this corps throughout this service, and their gallantry and discipline in action, have been conspicuous. I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the general and staff officers of the army. I was much indebted to Major-General Spencer's judgment and experience, in the decision which I formed with respect to the number of troops allotted to each point of defence; and for his advice and assistance throughout the action. In the position taken up by Major-General Ferguson's brigade, and in its advance upon the enemy, that officer shewed equal bravery and judgment; and much praise is due to Brigadier-General Fane, and Brigadier-General Anstruther, for their gallant defence of their position in front of Vimiera, and to Brigadier-General Nightingale, for the manner in which he supported the attack upon the enemy, made by Major-General Ferguson. Lieutenant-Colonel G. Tucker, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst, and the officers in the departments of the Adjutant and Quarter-Master-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, and the officers of my personal staff, rendered me the greatest assistance throughout the action. I have the honour to inclose herewith a return of the killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

N. B. Since writing the above, I have been informed that a French general officer, supposed to be general Thiebault, the chief of the staff, has been found dead upon the field of battle. A. W.

Total Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Lieut. Gen. the Right Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B. on the 21st of August, 1808.

1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 128 rank and file, 30 horses, killed; 3 majors, 10 captains, 19 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 2 staff, 27 serjeants, 4 drummers, 466 rank and file, 12 horses, wounded; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 46 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

Names of officers killed, wounded, and missing, on the 21st of August, 1808.

General Staff—captain Hardinge, of the 57th Foot, deputy assistant quarter-master-general, wounded. Royal Engineers—first lieutenant Wells, missing. 20th Light Dragoons—lieutenant-colonel Taylor, killed; captain Eustace, missing. 20th Foot—lieutenant Brooke, killed; lieutenant Hogg, wounded. 29th Foot—brigadier-major A. Creagh, wounded. 36th Foot—captain Herbert, slightly wounded; lieutenants Hart, Lought, and Edwards, slightly wounded; ensign Bosell, slightly wounded; lieutenant and adjutant Poveah, severely wounded. 40th Foot—captain Smith, slightly wounded; lieutenant Frankley, slightly wounded. 43d Foot—major Hearne, wounded; captains Ferguson, Brock, and Haverfield, wounded; lieut. Madden, wounded; ensign Wilson, wounded. 50th Foot—captain A. G. Cooke, killed; major Charles Hill, wounded; lieutenants John Kent, John Wilson, and Robert Way, wounded. 52d Foot—captain Ewart, wounded; lieut. Bell, wounded. 60th Foot—lieutenant Charles Kirk, wounded; Lewis Neith, wounded. 71st—captain A. Jones, slightly wounded; major Mackenzie, slightly wounded; lieut. J. D. Pratt, severely wounded; lieutenants W. Hartley, R. Dudgeon, and A. S. M'Intyre, slightly wounded; ensign W. Campbell, slightly wounded; acting adjutant R. R. M'Alpine, severely wounded. 82d—lieutenant R. Dunkin, killed. 95th—lieut. Pratt, wounded; ensign W. Cox, wounded. 97th—major J. Wilson, wounded; lieut. E. Kettlewell, wounded.

Total officers, non-commissioned officers and drummers, rank and file, and horses, killed, wounded, and missing, 783.

G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Gen.

Return of ordnance and ammunition taken in the action of the 21st inst.

1 six-pounder; 4 four-pounders; 2 three-pounders; 6 five-and-half inch howitzers; 2 ammunition waggons; 21 Portuguese ammunition cars; 40 horses; 4 mules.

The above is only the number already received in the park; but, from several accounts, there are eight more taken from the enemy. The ammunition waggons and cars contain a portion of powder, shells, and stores of all descriptions, and about twenty thousand rounds of musket ammunition.

WM. ROBE, Lt. Col. Commanding R. Artillery.

C O P I E S,

&c.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S
NARRATIVE.

GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS,

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

HAVING received the directions of the Judge Advocate General to attend you here this day, with as much detailed information, in writing, as I may think proper to offer, of my proceedings, from the time I failed with the troops from Ireland, to the time I gave up the command to Lieutenant General Sir Harry Burrard, I have now the honour to submit to the Court of Inquiry copies of my dispatches to the Secretary of State, detailing my proceedings.

As these proceedings are fully detailed in the dispatches, which likewise contain an account of my motives for my actions at the moment I carried them into execution, I should be satisfied if the Court were to form an opinion upon a consideration of their contents; but as the Court have expressed a desire, at the

same time, to have a narrative of my proceedings, I have drawn one out principally from the dispatches.

I sailed from Cork in the *Donegal* on the 12th of July; I went on board the *Crocodile* on the 13th, and sailed to Corunna, where I arrived on the 20th of July. I there found that the French had, on the 14th, defeated the army of Castile and Gallicia under Generals Cuesta and Blake; but having founded the Junta of Gallicia respecting their wish to have the assistance of the army under my command, in the existing crisis of their affairs, they declared explicitly that they did not want the assistance of troops, but eventually arms and ammunition, and money immediately.

A sum of 200,000*l.* for their use had arrived on the 20th, and their requisition for arms and ammunition was sent home immediately. The Junta of Gallicia, at the same time, expressed the greatest anxiety that the troops under my command should be employed in driving the French out of Portugal, as they were persuaded that the Spaniards of the north and the south of the peninsula would never have any decided success independently of each other; and could never make any great simultaneous effort to remove the French from Spain, till they should be driven from Portugal, and the British troops in that kingdom should connect the operations of the northern and the southern Spanish armies. The Junta of Gallicia at the same time strongly recommended to me to land in the north of Portugal, in order that I might bring forward and avail myself of the Portuguese troops which the Government of Oporto were collecting in the neighbourhood of that city.

I have to observe to the Court, that they will not see, in my dispatches to the Secretary of State from Corunna,

the detail of the wishes and sentiments of the Junta on my plan of operations, because they did not come regularly within the scope of a military dispatch; but the subject is mentioned in my dispatch to General Spencer of the 26th of July.

I sailed from Corunna on the 22d, and joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre next day, and quitted it again at night; and went to Oporto, in order to hold a conference with the Bishop and the General Officers in the command of the Portuguese troops. On my arrival at Oporto on the 24th, I received a letter from the Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, in which he recommended to me to leave the troops either at Oporto, or at the mouth of the Mondego river, and to proceed to Lisbon in a frigate, to communicate with him before I should determine upon the plan of operations and the landing-place.

The result of the conference which I had on the night of the 24th with the Bishop and the General Officers of the Portuguese army, was an agreement, that about 5000 Portuguese troops should be sent forward to co-operate with me against the enemy; that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about 1500, and a Spanish corps of about 1500 men, then on its march from Galicia, and another small Spanish corps of about 300 men, and all the Portuguese armed peasantry, should remain in the neighbourhood of Oporto, and in the province of Tralos Montes; a part to be employed in the blockade of Almeida, and a part in the defence of the province of Tralos Montes, which province was supposed to be threatened by an attack from the French corps under Marshal Bessieres, since the defeat of the Spanish armies under Blake and Cuesta at Rio Seco, on the 14th of July.

The Bishop of Oporto likewise promised to supply the army under my command with mules and other means of carriage, and with slaughter cattle.

I sailed from Oporto on the morning of the 25th, and joined the fleet, and settled with Captain Malcolm that it should go to Mondego Bay; and I left it again that night, and went to the mouth of the Tagus to confer with the Admiral. I joined him on the evening of the 26th, and I there received letters from General Spencer, at Port St. Mary's, in which he informed me, that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville, and he did not think it proper to embark it again till he should receive further orders from me; and he appeared to think that my presence in Andalusia, and the assistance of the troops under my command, were necessary to enable General Callanos to defeat General Du Pont.

As I was of opinion that the most essential object, for the Spaniards, as well as for us, was to drive the French out of Portugal, and that neither his corps nor mine were sufficiently strong when separate to be of much service any where, and that when joined they might effect the object which had been deemed of most importance in England and in Galicia, I immediately dispatched orders to General Spencer to embark his troops, unless he should be actually engaged in an operation which he could not relinquish without loss to the Spaniards, and to join me off the coast of Portugal.

The result of the information which I received from General Spencer, of the strength of the French army in Portugal, was, that they consisted of more than 20,000 men. The accounts of their numbers which I had received from the Admiral, and had received from the Portuguese, did not make their force so large; but upon

the whole I was induced to believe that they had not less than from 16 to 18,000 men. Of this number they had from 600 to 800 in the fort of Almeida, 600 or 800 in Elvas, 800 in Peniche, 16 or 1800 in Setuval, and the remainder were considered about 14,000 men, disposable for the defence of Lisbon and the forts on the Tagus. The whole of this disposable force was at this time in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, excepting about 2400 men at Alcobaça, under General Thomiere.

I considered, with the Admiral, the propriety of carrying into execution any of the proposed plans of attack upon the Tagus, or upon the coast in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon; and it appeared to us both, that all the attacks upon the river which had been proposed to Government, were impracticable; that the attack upon Cascaes Bay was likewise so; that a landing in any of the small bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock was a matter of considerable difficulty at any time; and that there was a risk, that if a part of the army, or even the whole army, were landed, the state of the surf which prevails upon the whole coast of Portugal, might prevent the disembarkation of the rear in the one case, and of the stores and provisions, which were necessary, in the other. At all events, the disembarkation would be made in the neighbourhood of the whole disposable force of the French army, and the British troops would be exposed to their attack on their landing, probably in a crippled, and certainly not in a very efficient state.

By making our disembarkation in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon, it was certain that we should not have the advantage which, at that time, we expected to derive from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops.

It appeared to us that the fort of Peniche, which was garrisoned by the enemy, would prevent the disembarka-

tion under the shelter of that peninsula; and therefore it appeared to the Admiral and to me, that it would be most advisable to disembark the troops in the Mondego river.

I quitted the Admiral off the Tagus on the 27th, and joined the fleet of transports off the Mondego, on the 30th.

I there received information from Government, dated the 15th July, that they intended to reinforce the army under my command with 5000 men under the command of Brigadier General Ackland, in the first instance, and eventually, with the corps consisting of 10,000 men, which had been under the command of Sir John Moore in Sweden; and that Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to command the army. I was likewise directed to carry into execution the instructions which I had received, if I conceived that my force was sufficiently strong.

Besides these dispatches from Government, I received information, on my arrival at the Mondego, of the defeat of the French corps under Du Pont by the Spanish General Castanos on the 30th July, and I was convinced that General Spencer, if he did not embark immediately upon receiving intelligence of that event, would do so as soon as he should receive my orders of the 26th July. I therefore considered his arrival as certain; and I had reason to expect the arrival of General Ackland's corps every moment, as I had been informed that it was to sail from Harwich and the Downs on the 19th July.

I also received accounts, at the same time, that General Loison had been detached from Lisbon across the Tagus into Alentejo on the 27th July, in order to subdue the insurrection in that province, and open the com-

munication with Elvas. The insurgents had lately been joined by about 1000 men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and the insurrection had made considerable progress, and was become formidable in Alentejo.

I therefore considered that I might commence the disembarkation of the troops, without risk of their being attacked by superior numbers, before one or both the reinforcements should arrive; and I was induced to disembark immediately, not only because the troops were likely to be better equipped, and more able to march in proportion as they should have been longer on shore; but because I had reason to believe that the Portuguese had been much discouraged by seeing the troops so long in the ships after the fleet had arrived in Mondego Bay; and I was certain they would suspect our inclination, or our ability to contend with the French, if they had not been disembarked as soon as I returned from the Tagus; I therefore determined to disembark as soon as the weather, and the state of the surf, would permit us, and we commenced the disembarkation on the 1st of August.

The difficulties of landing, occasioned by the surf, were so great, that the whole of the corps were not disembarked till the 5th, on which day General Spencer arrived, and his corps on the 6th; he had embarked at Port St. Mary's on the 21st July, when he had heard of the defeat of Du Pont by Castanos, and had not received the dispatches addressed to him by me on the 26th July. General Spencer disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army was in readiness to march forward.

From the 1st of August to that day, the time had been usefully spent in procuring the means for moving with the army, the necessary stores, provisions, and

baggage, and in arranging those means in the most advantageous manner to the different departments. The cavalry and artillery received a large remount of horses; means were procured for moving, with the army, a sufficient supply of ammunition and military stores, and a reasonable supply of hospital stores. But I determined to march towards Lisbon by that road which passes nearest to the sea-coast, in order that I might communicate with Captain Bligh of the *Alfred*, who attended the movements of the army with a fleet of victuallers and store-ships. The communication with this fleet, however, it was obvious would be very precarious, as well on account of the state of the surf on the coast, in the different points of rendezvous which had been settled, as because it might happen that it would be more advantageous to the army to take another line of march passing further inland.

I therefore made arrangements for carrying with the army such a supply of the articles of first necessity, as should render it independent of the fleet, till it should reach the Tagus, if circumstances should prevent the communication with the fleet, or should render it advantageous to relinquish it.

In the same period of time I also armed the Portuguese troops, and ascertained, as far as lay in my power, the degree of their discipline and efficiency, and recommended and superintended their organization. I offered such a sum of money, as the funds of the army could afford, to defray any expence which it might be deemed necessary to incur in their equipment for the field, which was declined by the Portuguese General Officers, and I met those gentlemen at Montemore Valho on the 7th, and arranged with them the plan of our operations and march, which was delayed for the main body of the

army till the 10th, at their desire, for the convenience of the Portuguese troops.

On the 8th, I wrote a letter to Sir Harry Burrard, which I left with Captain Malcolm of the Donegal, to be delivered to him upon his arrival at the Mondego, detailing all the circumstances of our situation, and recommending for his consideration a plan of operations for the corps under the command of Sir John Moore. The Court will find the copy of this letter enclosed in my dispatch to Lord Castlereagh of the 8th of August.

The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under General Hill and General Ferguson, as I had heard that General La Borde had collected his own corps, and General Thomiere's, consisting of from 5 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leyria, which place he threatened, as it contained a magazine formed for the use of the Portuguese army. On the 10th the main body followed, and the advanced guard arrived at Leyria on the 10th, and the main body on the 11th.

I received a letter from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle, at Corunna, on the 10th, detailing the inefficient state of the Gallician army under General Blake, that that General had separated his troops, which consisted of infantry, from the cavalry under General Cuesta, and that neither were in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, or even to follow that General, if he should march into Portugal, or to attack him if he should make any considerable detachment to that quarter. At the same time I received intelligence of the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte from Madrid on the 29th July; and I concluded that Bessieres, instead of moving out, or detaching towards Portugal, would cover the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte towards the French frontier. Whe-

ther he did so or not, it was obvious to me that I should have time for my operations against Junot, before Bessieres could arrive in Portugal to interrupt them; and it was probable that General Ackland's corps or Sir John Moore's would arrive and land in Portugal before Bessieres could come from the north of Spain.

Adverting therefore to the advanced state of the season, the necessity of communicating with the sea-coast, and the certainty that that communication would be nearly impracticable after the month of August, and to the still dispersed state of the French forces in Portugal, I considered it to be important to endeavour to perform those operations to which the army was equal, and for which it was fully equipped, without loss of time.

I communicated, however, the intelligence I had received from Mr. Stuart, and my opinion upon it, to Sir Harry Burrard, in a letter which I addressed to him on the 10th of August; a copy of which, and of a private letter to Sir Harry Burrard, the Court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 18th of August.

The Portuguese army, consisting of about 6000 men, including 500 cavalry, arrived at Leyria on the 12th, where the whole force was then assembled.

The French General Loison, who I have informed the Court, had been detached across the Tagus into Alentejo on the 26th or 27th of July, with between 5 and 6000 men, had withdrawn the greatest part of the garrison of St. Ubes, consisting of 1600 men, by which he had been joined, and he had immediately marched towards Evora, where he defeated and dispersed a Spanish detachment, consisting of 1000 men, and the force of the insurrection of Alentejo, collected in that town; he then marched to Elyas, reinvigoured that

place, suppressed the insurrection, and re-established the French authority in Alentejo, and made arrangements for the purchase and collection of the grain of that province.

He crossed the Tagus again at Abrantes, and marching down that river, he arrived at Thomar, about 16 miles to the S. E. from Leyria, on the evening of the 11th, on which day the British army arrived at Leyria.

The corps under La Borde was, at the same time, at Alcobaça, about 16 miles from Leyria to the S. W. : and the object of the French officers had evidently been to join at Leyria before the British troops could arrive there.

This town is on the high road from Lisbon to the north of Portugal, to the eastward of which, and nearly parallel to the road, there is a chain of high mountains which runs from Leyria nearly to the Tagus ; over which chain there is no good passage for carriages. In consequence of the early arrival, therefore, of the British troops at Leyria, General Loison was obliged to return to the southward before he could effect his junction with General La Borde, who was thus exposed to be attacked when alone ; and was attacked on the 17th of August. The Court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th of August, from Caldas, an outline of the operations of Loison's corps, of which what I have here stated is a more detailed account.

All the arrangements for the march having been made and communicated to the Portuguese officers, the army marched on the 13th, in two columns, to Calveria, and on the 14th, in two columns, to Alcobaça, from whence General La Borde had retreated in the course of the preceding night. The Portuguese troops had not marched

from Leyria, as had been arranged, and as I had expected, under the pretence that they had no provisions; and I received, on the 13th, in the evening, a letter from Colonel Trant, who was employed by me to communicate with the Portuguese General, in which he informed me of the General's intention to halt at Leyria, unless I should consent to supply the Portuguese troops with provisions from the British commissariat, on the march to Lisbon. He also explained a plan of operations which General Freire proposed to carry into execution, by which he would have been left without any communication with the British army, exposed to be attacked by the French army if they should choose to abandon the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and proceed to the northward and eastward; or even if they should be compelled to retire after an action with the British troops.

In my reply to this communication, I pointed out the impossibility of my complying with the demand for provisions, and the danger which would result from the adoption of the plan of operations proposed for the Portuguese corps.

I urged the Portuguese General in the most earnest terms to co-operate with me in the deliverance of his country from the French, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his Prince; and I pointed out to him the resources of which he could avail himself to feed the army. I then proposed to him, that if he should not march with his whole corps, he should send to join me 1000 regular infantry, all his light troops and his cavalry, which troops I engaged to feed, as the utmost I could undertake to perform in that way.

These troops, in number 1000 regular infantry, 400

light troops, and 250 cavalry, joined me at Alcobaça on the evening of the 14th with Colonel Trant, and remained with me during the remainder of the operations.

The main body of the Portuguese corps, instead of carrying into execution the plan of operations which I had originally proposed, or that which General Freire had substituted, adopted the measure of safety which I had recommended in the event of his determination not to join me, and remained at Leyria, and afterwards at Caldas and Obidos, till the 22d of August.

On the arrival of the army at Alcobaça, I immediately opened a communication with Captain Bligh of the Alfred, who had been for two days waiting with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships off Nazareth, and a supply of bread and oats was immediately landed; and I appointed Peniche, which place I intended to reconnoitre, as our next point of communication.

The army marched on the 15th in two columns to Caldas, where it halted the 16th, to allow the Commissariat to come up and receive the supplies which had been landed at Nazareth. On the 15th, in the evening, there was a skirmish between the troops of the advanced guard of La Borde's corps and our riflemen, in which the latter sustained some loss. But we kept possession of the post at Obidos, which commands the valley of Caldas.

The details of this affair are published in the Gazette, as are those of the action of the 17th.

Throughout that day we had reason to believe that General Loison, who had moved from Rio Major on the evening of the 16th, would be found on La Borde's right, and the disposition for the attack was made accordingly. During the action a French officer, who

was dying of his wounds, informed me, that they had expected Loison to join them that day at one o'clock by their right, which was the reason for which they stood our attack, that their numbers were 6000, and that their loss had been severe. Intelligence to the same purport was received from other prisoners; and as a small patrol of French infantry appeared at no great distance from the left of our position on the 17th at dusk, and I heard that Loison's corps was at that moment arriving at Bombarral, which was about five miles from the field of battle, I conclude that the junction had been intended, and was prevented only by our early attack.

At all events, great caution was necessary in all the movements of that day; and indeed the nature of the ground over which the troops were obliged to move, rendered a very rapid attack impossible.

The two French corps joined on that night, and retired beyond Torres Vedras, which was ten miles from the field of battle towards Cabeça de Montachique. My intention was to march to Torres Vedras on the morning of the 18th, and the troops were under arms, and the orders for the march had been issued, when I received from General Anstruther an account of his arrival on the coast, and of his junction with Captain Bligh. My original intention had been to employ the corps under General Ackland and General Anstruther, in the siege of Peniche, if I should find it necessary to undertake it; or if I should not, to send them down the coast to effect a landing in some of the bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, in the rear of the enemy, while I should press upon their front. But the disappointment which I experienced in the hoped-for co-operation of the Portuguese troops, which were

with me in the action of the 17th, and above all the determined and gallant resistance of the enemy in that action, induced me to be of opinion, that I ought to land General Anstruther's brigade, and General Ackland's when it should arrive, and to join those troops to the army.

I therefore marched on the 18th to Lourinha, from whence I communicated again with General Anstruther, and on the 19th to Vimeira; which appeared, on the whole, to be the position best calculated to secure the junction of General Anstruther, at the same time that it was a march in advance on our route. On account of the calms, the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, could not stand in till late on the 19th; and General Anstruther did not land till that evening, and he formed a junction with two brigades, detached from our left, on the morning of the 20th, and took his position in the advanced guard.

Between the 18th and 20th, the French corps had assembled at and about Torres Vedras; the troops last arrived under General Junôt, forming the advanced guard, in a strong position in front of the town; and the divisions of La Borde and Loison, the main body, in another strong position behind it.

Their cavalry was very active throughout the days of the 19th and 20th; they covered the whole country; patrolled frequently up to our position; and on the 20th, one patrol was pushed into the rear of our right, as far as the landing-place at Maccira.

Under these circumstances we could gain no detailed information of the enemy's position, excepting that it was very strong, and occupied by their whole force.

My intention was to march on the morning of the 21st, and orders were issued accordingly: I should have

pushed the advanced guard as far as the heights of Maffra, and should have halted the main body about four or five miles from that place. By this movement, the enemy's position at Torres Vedras would have been turned, and I should have brought the army into a country of which I had an excellent map, and topographical accounts, which had been drawn up for the use of the late Sir Charles Stewart; and the battle, which it was evident would be fought in a few days, would have had for its field a country of which we had a knowledge, not very distant from Lisbon, into which town, if we had been successful, we might have entered with the retreating enemy.

I was informed in the middle of the day of the 20th, that General Ackland's brigade was in the offing, and I made arrangements for their disembarkation as soon as they should arrive; and in the evening of this day Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira roads in the Brazen; he immediately assumed the command of the army.

The Court will observe that the last of my dispatches to the Secretary of State is dated on the 18th, and the account of my proceedings on the 19th and 20th, the two last days of my command, is made from memory, assisted by reference to private letters written at the time; and if the Court should wish it, it can be substantiated by evidence.

THE END.

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF ENQUIRY
TO THE KING.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

WE the under-written General Officers of the army, in obedience to Your Majesty's warrant, which bears date the 1st day of November 1808, commanding us strictly to enquire into the conditions of a *Suspension of Arms*, concluded on the 22d August 1808, between Your Majesty's army in Portugal, and the French force in that country; and also into a definitive *Convention*, concluded with the French General commanding on the 31st August following; also into all the causes and circumstances (whether arising from the previous operations of the British army, or otherwise, which led to them); and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and such other Commander or Commanders of Your Majesty's forces in Portugal; and of any other person or persons, as far as the same were connected with the said Armistice, Suspension of Arms, and Convention; and to report to Your Majesty a state thereof, as it shall appear, together with our opinion thereon, and also our opinion, whether any, and what further proceedings should be had thereupon:

We have, at several meetings, perused and considered Your Majesty's orders and instructions, as transmitted to us by the Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh, Your Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, together with sundry letters, and other papers, therewith transmitted: And have heard and examined Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, and other principal Officers employed on the said expedition, with such witnesses as any of them desired; and also such other persons as seemed to us most likely to give any material information: And in order that Your Majesty may be fully possessed of every circumstance which has appeared in the course of this inquiry,

We beg leave to lay before Your Majesty the whole of our examinations and proceedings to this our Report annexed. And upon the most diligent and careful review of the whole matter, we do, in further obedience to Your Royal Command, most humbly report to Your Majesty,

That it appears, that early in the month of May 1808, a very considerable force, destined for foreign service, was assembled near Cork, the command of which, it is imagined, was intended for Sir Arthur Wellesley; that in the month of May, universal and unexpected resistance to French tyranny had taken place in Spain; that application was made for the assistance of Britain; and that Government, with the universal concurrence of the country, determined on giving Spain and Portugal, then also in commotion, the most effectual aid.

It appears, that in consequence of such determination, Major-General Spencer, before the surrender of the French fleet at Cadiz, was off that port with about 5000 men, sent by Sir Hew Dalrymple from Gibraltar. His assistance not having been called for there, he proceeded to the mouth of the Tagus, with a view of aiding Sir Charles Cotton's fleet in forcing a passage, it having been represented that there were not in the forts, and about Lisbon, more than four thousand men. But General Spencer being then off the Tagus (June 24), reports, from the best authority he could have, that the enemy had 11,000 men in and about Lisbon, and 9500 at St. Ubes, the east of Portugal, and elsewhere. In this situation the intended attack could not take place, and General Spencer returned to Cadiz and Gibraltar.

It appears, that on the 14th June, application was made to the Admiralty to provide a convoy to sail with the troops then under orders from Cork, on the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, appointed to the command.

On the 21st June, Lord Castlereagh acquaints Sir Arthur Wellesley, that accounts from Cadiz are bad, and General Spencer was returning to Gibraltar, and that the Cabinet postpone their instructions to him till more is known.

On the 28th June, Lord Castlereagh acquaints General Spencer, then supposed at Gibraltar, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with nine thousand men, is ordered to proceed from Cork, and to act with his (Spencer's) corps, in support of the Spanish nation. He is, therefore, with his corps, to go off to Cadiz to wait for him; in the mean time, availing himself of any circumstance that offers of acting to advantage, even within the Straits.

It appears that, on the 12th July, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Cork with 9000 men (under instructions of the 30th June), generally to aid the Spanish nation, and the principal object to attack the French in the Tagus; but authorized, as he understood, to pursue any other object, if more likely to conduce to the benefit of the two nations. And (of the 15th July) to endeavour, if possible, not only to expel the enemy from Lisbon, but to cut off their retreat towards Spain. He arrived at Corunna the 20th, communicated with the Gallician Junta, who wished the troops to be employed in expelling the French from Portugal, and recommended him to land in that country (this was on the 26th communicated to General Spencer). Sailed from Corunna the 22d, went to Oporto (leaving the fleet off Cape Finisterre); arrived the 24th, desired by Sir Charles Cotton to leave the troops at Oporto or Mondego Bay, and come to the Tagus to communicate. Had a conference with the Generals and Bishop, at Oporto, about the disposal of their force. The Bishop promised mules and other means of carriage, and also a sufficiency of slaughter cattle.

It appears that Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Oporto the 25th July, ordered the transports to go to Mondego, proceeded and joined the Admiral off the Tagus the 26th. Letters were received from General Spencer at Cadiz, to which he had returned, and where the Spaniards pressed him to remain, and he expected orders from Sir Arthur Wellesley. Agreed with Sir Charles Cotton, that landing in the mouth of the Tagus was impracticable, and unadvisable, as there was great risk from the state of the surf, from the defences and adverse nature of the coast, and from the neighbourhood of the enemy's whole disposable force, to whose attack we

should be exposed in landing, probably in a crippled state, certainly not in a very efficient one.—Peniche fortress was in possession of the enemy. Mondego Bay was therefore agreed on as most eligible to land at. Thinking it most important to drive the French from Portugal, he ordered General Spencer to embark (with his 5000 men), and join off that coast. By his information of the 24th June, the French had more than 20,000 men in Portugal. The Admiral's account made them less. Sir Arthur Wellesley thought they had not less than from 16 to 18,000.

It appears, that Sir Arthur Wellesley quitted the Admiral off the Tagus on the 27th, and joined the transports off Mondego on the 30th. He there received information from Government (dated 15th July), that a reinforcement of Brigadier-General Acland and five thousand men was intended for him, and eventually ten thousand more men, under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore; that Sir Hew Dalrymple was to command the army; that Sir Arthur Wellesley was also to proceed on the instructions he had received, viz. the attack of Lisbon, if his force was sufficient. Dupont having surrendered, General Spencer's arrival was now considered as certain, as also that of General Acland very soon. The insurrection in Alentejo was a fortunate occurrence at this time, and Sir Arthur Wellesley also received information from the Secretary of State, dated 15th July, that Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command of the forces in Spain and Portugal, and Sir Harry Burrard second in command. And if in the mean time he was joined by any Officer, senior in rank, he (Sir Arthur Wellesley) was to serve under him. Of the same date, Sir Harry Burrard was also acquainted by the Secretary of State that operations are intended to be directed, in the first instance, to the reduction of the Tagus, and secondly, to the security of Cadiz, and destruction of the enemy's force in Andalusia.

It appears, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was induced, from various strong reasons, as stated in his Narrative, to disembark in Mondego Bay. This commenced on the 1st of August; but the surf occasioned great difficulties, so that his corps was not all landed before the 5th. Ge-

neral Spencer arrived on the 5th, and his corps on the 6th. They landed on the 7th and 8th.

It appears, that from the 1st August till the 8th, when the whole was disembarked, that measures were taking for the immediate movement of the army towards Lisbon, and horses and carriages were solicited. Sir Arthur Wellesley armed the Portuguese troops, offered money to assist in equipping them for the field, which was declined by their General Officers, whom he met on the 7th, and arranged a plan of operations and march, which was delayed, at their desire, and for their convenience, till the 10th. He also left full information of his situation, intentions, and other circumstances, for Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard, on his arrival at Mondego (and for whom he had previously left advices at the Berlings, off Peniche, in case of his making that point), and recommended a plan of operations for Sir John Moore's corps on its arrival, to act towards Santarem and the Tagus. On the 8th, he renewed his communications to Sir Harry Burrard, leaving them at Mondego.

It appears, for the many substantial reasons enumerated in Sir Arthur Wellesley's Narrative, and with the aid of 6000 Portuguese, from whose co-operation he had reason to expect great advantage, but in which he was subsequently disappointed, that he determined to proceed (without waiting for his expected reinforcements, of which he had been apprized), with his own army, of 13,000 men (British), against an enemy who, he knew, could not well produce a greater number in the field. He advanced by the coast road towards Lisbon, for the substantial reason, amongst others, of preserving his communication with the shipping, from which alone he could derive his bread. Wine could be found in all the villages occupied by the army, and slaughter cattle were furnished by contractors.

It appears, that the army marched, on the 9th and 10th of August, from Mondego, having horses, although indifferent, for 18 pieces of cannon, for ammunition great and small, a considerable store of bread, and a moderate hospital establishment. The cavalry, about 400, including 200 Portuguese.

On the 10th and 11th, they arrived at Leyria.

On the 13th, marched to Calveria.

On the 14th, to Alcabaça, where they received bread and oats, landed at Nazareth.

On the 15th, to Caldas, and halted the 16th, receiving further supplies from Nazareth.

It appears, that hitherto the Portuguese had moved on his left, extending towards the Tagus, but they now raised such difficulties about subsistence, and proceeding on the manner Sir Arthur Wellesley thought most advisable, that he dispensed with their co-operation, on condition they would send him 1600 men, to be at his disposal, and to whom he was to furnish bread. He also recommended to their General, as a measure of safety, to remain about Caldas, which they did till after the battle of Vimiera.

On the 17th, there was a very considerable action near Obidos, with a corps of 6000 men, under General Laborde, who had taken post in the defiles, and was forced to retire with considerable loss. This and a small previous action cost us about 480 men. The army was that night at Valla Verde, and on the morning of the 18th heard of the arrival of General Anstruther's brigade on the coast.

On the 18th, the army marched to Lourinha, and on the 19th to Vimiera, where it halted on the 20th.— This day Brigadier-General Anstruther's brigade (2400 men) joined, and Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard arrived off Marceira in the afternoon.

On the 21st, early in the morning, Brigadier-General Acland's brigade (1750 men) landed, and joined the army.

It appears, that when Sir Arthur Wellesley was at Leyria, the enemy had the two considerable advanced corps of Laborde and Loison in their front, which (as he moved on with a Portuguese corps on his left, as far as Alcabaça) fell back towards Lisbon, and joined Junot, who had assembled, by the 20th, from 12 to 14,000 men, at Torres Vedras, about eight miles from Vimiera. Calculating probably, that the weather might disappoint the landing of Anstruther's and Acland's brigades, whom he must have espied in the offing on the 19th and 20th, he determined to attack Sir Arthur Wellesley's army in its situation at Vimiera, on the

21st, before the junction of so considerable a force. In this enterprize General Junot completely failed. His attack was repelled in the most gallant manner, and with great loss he was obliged to retreat upon Torres Vedras, and Cabeça de Monte Chique, where he endeavoured to re-assemble his troops. The detail of this honourable action, in which we lost 700 men, is given in the Extraordinary Gazette of September 16, published upon this occasion.

It appears, that Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard having, on the 21st July, received notice of Your Majesty's appointment of him as second in command of the forces placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and having also received all necessary instructions, went immediately to Portsmouth, embarked on the 27th, and sailed on the 31st, in the Audacious, together with the fleet of transports, containing a corps of 10,000 infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore.

After a continuance of contrary wind and bad weather, the fleet was near Cape Finisterre on the 16th August; and it having been recommended to him, that before he proceeded to the southward of Oporto, he should himself go there, or send another person, to collect information, and meet the fleet at sea, he shifted, with several Officers of his staff, to the Brazen sloop, and arriving at Oporto on the 17th, learnt that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed at Mondego, and proceeded along the coast-road to the southward.

On the 18th, he arrived off Mondego, and there found dispatches from Sir Arthur Wellesley, recommending that Sir John Moore's corps should land at Mondego, and march upon Santarem, to confine the movements of the enemy on that side; and also stating that the army must depend on the transports for bread, and that reliance could not be placed on the resources of the country.

The difficulty of equipping and supplying Sir John Moore's corps for an interior operation at a distance from the rest of the army, and thinking that if thus acting separately, towards Santarem, he must have been inferior to the enemy if they chose to push that way; and on enquiry, not having been able to hear of 150

mules promised by the Bishop of Oporto, Sir Harry Burrard was induced for the present to decline the proposed operation.

Sir Harry Burrard proceeded in the *Brazen* to the southward, and in the evening of the 19th received information of the action of the 17th, near Obidos. He immediately sent back Lieutenant-Colonel Donkin to meet Sir John Moore, and directed him to land in the Mondego Bay; and under a knowledge of Sir Arthur Wellefley's former dispatches (which he transmitted) to act as he thought most beneficial to the service in his support. He also sent off Lieutenant-Colonel Carey to land at St. Martines, and to communicate with Sir Arthur Wellefley.

It appears, that Sir John Moore did arrive at Mondego on the 20th; that he began to disembark; that on the 22d he received an order from Sir Harry Burrard, to re-embark such as he had landed, and proceeded to Marceira; that he arrived on the 24th at Marceira Bay; and that he disembarked his corps on the days from the 25th to the 29th, the several divisions joining the army as they landed.

It appears, that on the evening of the 20th of August, when Sir Harry Burrard arrived off the landing-place of Marceira, he was going to land, when Sir Arthur Wellefley came on board, gave an account of the general state of things, and ended by saying, that he had intended to march the next morning, by five o'clock, by the Mafra road, the enemy having assembled his forces at Torres Vedras.

On detailing the many difficulties to be encountered, such as the impossibility of leaving his victuallers and the shore, for any considerable distance, the inferior number of his cavalry, and the state of his artillery and carriage horses and mules, the strength of the ground he had to go over, which presented many difficulties, and the very little dependence which could be placed on the Portuguese assistance, Sir Harry Burrard, on due consideration of all circumstances, decided, that it was more advantageous to wait for Sir John Moore's reinforcement, than to run any risk of defeating the great object, or of sacrificing a great many men without its complete accomplishment. [In this determination, Sir Harry

Burrard states, he was confirmed, by the opinions of Brigadier-General Clinton and Colonel Murray, his Adjutant and Quarter-master Generals.] He therefore gave orders to Sir Arthur Wellesley accordingly, that the army was not to proceed on the morning of the 21st, and more especially, as the landing and junction of General Acland's brigade, on the night of the 20th, was yet unaccomplished and necessarily uncertain.

It appears, that Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to Vimiera, and Sir Harry Burrard remained on board ship the night of the 20th, to complete his necessary dispatches by the return of the Brazen sloop.

During the night of the 20th, and the morning of the 21st, our patrols gave intelligence of the movements of the enemy; but being inferior in cavalry, they could go to no distance, and their reports were vague. As Sir Arthur Wellesley thought it probable, if he did not attack the enemy, that they would attack him, he prepared to receive them at daylight in the morning, by posting the nine-pounders and strengthening his centre, where he expected the attack, from the manner of the enemy's patrolling.

The enemy first appeared in force on our left, about eight in the morning, and it was soon obvious that their attack would be made on our left, and on our advanced guard before Vimiera; the position of the greater part of the army was immediately changed by an extension to the left. The action commenced, and was concluded, in the manner detailed in the Extraordinary Gazette, and terminated in a victory honourable and glorious to the British arms.

It appears, that Sir Harry Burrard had no information from, or communication with, Sir Arthur Wellesley during the night of the 20th; but on the morning of the 21st, about nine o'clock, just as he was approaching the shore, he met an officer, sent by Sir Arthur Wellesley, with information, that large bodies of the enemy had been seen moving towards our left.—Sir Harry Burrard proceeded towards Vimiera, with as much expedition as an indifferent horse would allow, on a hilly road; being two and a half miles from the landing-place. He arrived there before ten, at a time that the advanced corps (Anstruther's and Fane's brigades)

were vigorously attacked. The Officers conducting Sir Harry Burrard passed through the village, and brought him to Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the heights behind the villages, where the left of the army had been originally posted. Here he was informed, saw, and approved of, the steps taken by Sir Arthur Wellesley to repulse the enemy, and directed him to proceed in the execution of an operation he had so happily and so well begun.

By this time it was evident that the attack upon the village and advanced corps was not meant to be further supported; it was completely repulsed, and the enemy retired in considerable confusion. They were not followed by the infantry, as the troops had received orders not to quit their position, without particular order from Sir Arthur Wellesley. The detachment of the 20th light dragoons alone pursued, but falling in with a superior cavalry, were soon obliged to return with considerable loss. This order had been very properly given, on a consideration that the principal effort of the enemy would still be made on our left, and upon this point the enemy had just opened his cannonade, and the brigade under Major-General Ferguson was already engaged at distant musketry. As support arrived, he advanced, and the enemy gave way, abandoning three pieces of cannon. Major-General Ferguson still advanced, and a mile from where the first battery was taken, another also was taken. The enemy finally made an attempt to regain their last battery, but were repulsed by the 71st and 82d regiments, and obliged to retire with great loss.

Soon after twelve the firing had ceased, and the enemy's cavalry were seen from our left, in bodies of about 200, by General Ferguson; and about the same time General Spencer saw a line formed, about three miles in front of our centre.

About half-past twelve, Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed to Sir Harry Burrard to advance from his right, with three brigades upon Torres Vedras, and with the other five brigades to follow the enemy, who had been defeated by our left.

It appears that the situation of the army at this moment was—on the right, Major-General Hill's brigade, which had not been engaged, was on the height behind

Vimiera, and at a distance of about three miles from those of Generals Ferguson and Nightingale on the left. In front of Vimiera, and in the centre, were the brigades of Anstruther and Fane, which had been warmly engaged. Brigadier-Generals Bowes's and Acland's brigades were advanced on the heights, towards the left, in support of Generals Ferguson and Nightingale. Brigadier-General Craufurd's brigade was detached rather to the rear of the left, about half a mile from Major-General Ferguson, to support the Portuguese troops, making front in that direction.

It appears, that although the enemy was completely repulsed, the degree of expedition with which a pursuit could be commenced, considering the extended position of the army at that time, and the precaution to be taken against the superior cavalry of the enemy, must have depended on various local circumstances only to be calculated by those upon the spot.

This very circumstance of a superior cavalry retarding our advance, would allow the enemy's infantry, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat in the most rapid manner, till they should arrive at any given and advantageous point of rallying and formation; nor did Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 17th of August, when the enemy had not half the cavalry as on the 21st, pursue a more inconsiderable and beaten army with any marked advantage; for he says (*Gazette Extraordinary*) "The enemy retired with the utmost regularity, and the greatest celerity; and, notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain"—and again, "He succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to my want of cavalry."

It may also be considered, that as the attack on our centre had been repulsed long before that on our left had, the attacking corps, which, as has been observed, was not pursued (but by the 20th dragoons, not exceeding 150), had time (above an hour) to reassemble, and to occupy such ground as might afterwards facilitate the retreat of their right, and that the enemy were actually and visibly formed in one or more lines at about three miles in front of the centre.

From these and other fair military grounds, as allowed by Sir Arthur Wellesley; from those that occurred in Sir Harry Burrard's first interview with Sir Arthur Wellesley; from the utmost certainty of the immediate arrival of Sir John Moore's corps, which, if they had not stopt at Mondego Bay, would have been at Marceira on the 21st; Sir Harry Burrard declined making any further pursuit that day, or ordering the army to march next morning early.—[In this opinion Sir Harry Burrard states Brigadier-General Clinton and Colonel Murray concurred.]

On the 22d, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, and assumed the command of the army.

It appears that Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple having, on the 7th of August, received Your Majesty's commands of the 15th July, to take the command of the forces to be employed in Portugal and Spain, and that Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard was to be second in command, he sailed with the first fair wind from Gibraltar on the 13th of August, communicated with Lord Collingwood off Cadiz, and on the 19th with Admiral Sir Charles Cotton off the Tagus, from whom he received information of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, then landed in Portugal, and also that Brigadier-General Acland, with his brigade, was on the coast, looking for an opportunity of joining him. Sir Hew Dalrymple sailing along the coast with an intention of making Mondego Bay, heard of the action of the 21st; and that Sir Harry Burrard was arrived; this determined him to make for Marceira Bay, where transports were at anchor. He landed in Marceira Bay early in the forenoon of the 22d, proceeded to Vimiera, about two miles and a quarter distant, and after a short conversation with his two predecessors in command, whose instructions were those by which he was to act, he ordered the army to march early in the morning of the 23d, undoubtedly as soon as it could be put in motion after his arrival.

It appears that in this situation of things the French General Kellermann arrived about noon of the 22d at Vimiera, with proposals for a *suspension of arms*, in order to settle a definitive Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. Lieutenant-Generals

Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Arthur Wellesley assisted the Commander of the forces in the discussions that took place on this subject; and it appearing to them, under all circumstances, as commanding a force acting in alliance with the sovereign of Portugal, and combating in their own country (from whence we then derived no material assistance), against an enemy in actual possession of their capital, their fortresses, and, in a military point of view, of their kingdom, that a Convention, or Capitulation, if the opportunity offered, which should speedily and honourably expel the French army from Portugal, was expedient and advisable, a cessation of arms was agreed upon, to terminate at 48 hours notice. The leading articles of a Convention were also settled, and General Kellermann returned towards Lisbon, about nine at night, with the instrument stated in the Extra Gazette of the 16th of Sept. but not to be considered as effectual without the concurrence of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton.

Early on the 23d, in the morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Quarter-Master-General, set out with the proposed agreement, to procure the concurrence of the Admiral, and returned in the night of the 24th, with Sir Charles Cotton's answer, that he could not accede, but that he would enter into treaty with the Russian Admiral.

It appears that Sir Charles Cotton having declined to sanction the Russian article, the Commander of the forces conceived the Armistice to end, and determined on sending Lieutenant-Colonel Murray to announce the recommencement of hostilities, at the end of forty-eight hours, in order, if General Junot chose it, that we might treat on the remaining articles as a basis. This officer had powers to treat without delay. He had the Commander of the forces' letter of the 25th, and certain memoranda of Sir Arthur Wellesley, as laid before the Board, which shewed the exact footing on which he was to act, as also General Kellermann's sentiments on the Russian question. Early on the 27th, communication was had from General Junot and Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, that a treaty was in agitation, which was answered.

It appears that when the proposed treaty (ratified by

General Junot) of the 28th August, was brought by Captain Dalrymple on the 29th to head-quarters Ramalhal, all the Lieutenant-Generals (Burrard, Moore, Hope, Frazer, Wellesley) were present, Lord Paget excepted (because not long previously summoned). The proposed treaty was, however, formally discussed. Minutes of proposed alterations were taken by Sir Arthur Wellesley, as laid before the Board, and the Commander of the forces has no reason to believe that Sir John Moore, or any of the Lieutenant-Generals that came with him, expressed any disapprobation of the state and terms of the negotiation.

The treaty, with the alterations proposed, was retransmitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray.

It appears when the treaty concluded by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray on the 30th, was brought by him to Torres Vedras on the 31st for ratification, the Lieutenant-Generals present were convened, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was sent for. Lord Paget, who was at a distance, did not come, nor did Sir Arthur Wellesley, his corps having marched that morning. The other Lieutenant-Generals met (Burrard, Moore, Frazer, Hope), the alterations made by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray were approved, and the treaty then ratified by the Commander of the forces (Sir Hugh Dalrymple) with the approbation of the Lieutenant-Generals present.

Some of the articles of the treaty of the 28th, before objected to by the Lieutenant-Generals, were altered in that of the 30th, and some other good alterations had been inserted, not before suggested. A comparison of the treaty of the 28th, and that ratified, will shew the alterations.

The meetings of the Lieutenant-Generals, the Commander of the forces did not call, or consider as regular councils of war. He sought to benefit from their talents and experience, by consulting them on exigent cases, and by pursuing the measure he might himself deem most for the good of Your Majesty's service, after availing himself of the advantage he might draw from their reasonings, and he does not recollect there was any dissentient opinion on the 31st, as to the ratification of the Convention.

It appears that Sir John Moore's corps having arrived at Mondego Bay on the 20th of August, began to disembark; that they re-embarked, and arrived off Marceira Bay on the 24th; that from the 25th to the 29th they landed under considerable difficulties, and successively joined the army at Torres Vedras.

It appears that some of the principal advantages to arise from the Convention were in the contemplation of the Generals.

That it immediately liberated the kingdom of Portugal from the dominion of the French, thereby restoring to the inhabitants their capital and fortresses, their principal sea-ports, their personal liberty, property, religion, and established government.

That it relieved a great extent of Spanish frontier from all apprehensions of an enemy, and the whole of Spain from that of having an enemy behind them, and allowed all parts of Spain to take more effective measures for its general defence; as well as permitted Portugal immediately to contribute for their mutual support.

That it enabled the British army immediately to enter Spain, if required, by central routes, while it transported the French force to a very distant part of their own coast, far removed from the Spanish frontier.

That it immediately released 4000 Spanish soldiers, and sent them to the defence of Catalonia; it also released from the Portuguese frontier another body of 2000 Spanish troops. The Portuguese army also became disposable for the common cause.

To the men of war and transports, which, at this season of the year, with great difficulty could keep their station near the coast, and on whose presence the supplies and operations of the army depended, the opening of the Tagus afforded immediate shelter.

It is further urged by the Generals, as much more than probable, that if the enemy had been required to lay down their arms, and surrender prisoners of war, they would not have complied; but if driven to extremity, that they would have retired upon Lisbon, reinforced by 6000 Russians, who must have been thus compelled to share their fate; and in the temporary attack of

this city, much calamity and destruction must have ensued.

Also that, masters of the Russian fleet, and of the boats and shipping in the Tagus, the passage of the river was ensured to them; that they could have defended, for a considerable time, its east bank, and prevented the occupation of the Tagus by our fleet; that, with the strong fortresses of Alentejo in their possession, they could have protracted a destructive war, to the great detriment of Portugal and the Spanish cause, by finding employment for the greater part of the British army, for the remainder of the year, and whose difficulties and losses in such operation must have been very considerable.

It appears, that the forts on the Tagus were taken possession of on the 2d of September, by the British troops, and the port was then opened to our shipping: that on the 5th the army had its right at St. Juliens, and its left on the heights of Bellas: that on the 8th or 9th a British corps marched into Lisbon, to ensure the tranquillity of that city, during the embarkation of the enemy, who were all sent off (except the last division, purposely detained) before the end of the month, and part of the British army was then actually on its route towards the Spanish frontier.

It appears that, during the discussion, and afterwards during the execution of the Convention, much firmness was shewn in resisting the pretensions and interpretations of the enemy; every stipulation being restricted to its fair, honourable, and grammatical meaning, and the French not allowed to carry off, but obliged to disgorge plunder, which they affected to consider as private property.

It appears that pains were taken to misrepresent and raise a clamour in Portugal against this Convention; but when it was generally known, and its effects felt, the people of Lisbon, and of the country, seem to have expressed their gratitude and thanks for the benefits attending it.

It has been urged by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and allowed by Major-General Spencer, that in Egypt, in 1801 (after the victory of the 21st of March, the French having thrown their whole force into Alexan-

dria and Grand Cairo, about 10,000 men in each place), that at the siege of Alexandria, in August, the country was in the full possession of the British and Turks. The garrison, cut off from every possibility of relief, could only have held out some days, when a capitulation was granted to it, September the 2d, as favourable as the Convention of Cintra to the army of Junot (of 24,000 French, and 6000 Russians), and perfectly similar in all the chief articles of men, baggage, artillery, conveyance, &c.; also, that the same terms had been previously granted to the garrison of Cairo, under much the same circumstances. By these two Conventions, or Capitulations, above 20,000 French evacuated Egypt, and the British army was left disposable for other purposes.

On the whole it appears, that the operations of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, from his landing in Mondego Bay the 1st of August, until the conclusion of the action at Vimiera, the 21st of August, were highly honourable and successful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished General at the head of a British army of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th and 21st to 17,000, deriving only some small aid from a Portuguese corps (1600 men), and against whom an enemy, not exceeding 14,000 men in the field, was opposed; and this before the arrival of a very considerable reinforcement from England, under Lieut.-General Sir John Moore, which however did arrive and join the army, from the 25th to the 30th of August.

It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the Board to pronounce with confidence, whether or not a pursuit after the battle of the 21st, could have been efficacious; nor can the Board feel confident to determine on the expedience of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, when Sir Harry Burrard has stated weighty considerations against such a measure. Further, it is to be observed, that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy's repulse, as afterwards became clear to the army, and have been represented to the Board. And considering the extraordinary circumstances under which two new Commanding Generals arrived from the ocean, and joined the army (the one during, and the other imme-

diately after, a battle, and those successively superseding each other, and both the original Commander within the space of 24 hours), it is not surprising that the army was not carried forward, until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the Generals being acquainted with the actual state of things, and of their army, and proceeding accordingly.

It appears that the Convention of Cintra in all its progress and conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were not objected to by the five distinguished Lieutenant-Generals of that army; and other General Officers who were on that service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have also concurred in the great advantages that were immediately gained, to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the Convention at that time.

On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut. Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on Your Majesty's arms.

All which is most dutifully submitted.

(Signed) DAVID DUNDAS, General,
 MOIRA, General.
 PETER CRAIG, General.
 HEATHFIELD, General.
 PEMBROKE, Lieut.-Gen.
 G. NUGENT, Lieut.-Gen.
 OL. NICOLLS, Lieut.-Gen.

Dec. 22, 1808.

Judge Advocate General's Office, Dec. 27, 1808.

In consequence of the following letter from His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, to General Sir David Dundas, as President, viz.

SIR,

Horse Guards, Dec. 25, 1808.

The Judge Advocate General having delivered to me, to be laid before His Majesty, the several papers and documents, containing all the examinations and proceedings taken before the Board of Enquiry, of which you are the President, together with your report and opinion upon the whole of the late operations of His Majesty's forces in Portugal, as connected with the Armistice and subsequent Convention of Cintra, I think it incumbent on me to state to you, that although the report is fully detailed, and perfectly explanatory of all the transactions as they appeared in evidence before you; yet upon a due consideration of the whole matter, it certainly appears that your opinion upon the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, which the words of His Majesty's warrant expressly enjoin should be strictly examined, enquired into, and reported upon, has been altogether omitted.

I feel it my duty, therefore, to call your attention to these two principal features of this important case, the Armistice and Convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the same again into your most serious consideration, and subjoin to the opinion which you have already given upon the other points submitted to your examination and enquiry, whether, under all the circumstances which appear in evidence before you, on the relative situation of the two armies, on the 22d of August 1808, it is your opinion that an Armistice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that Armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the Armistice, and when all the British forces were landed, it is your opinion that a Convention was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that Convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon.

I am the more desirous that you should resume the consideration of these two points, the Armistice and Convention, as it appears upon the face of your Report, that a difference of opinion exists among the Members of the Board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions. You will be pleased, therefore, to desire such of the Members as may be of a different opinion from the majority upon these two questions, to record upon the face of the proceedings their reasons for such dissent.

I am, Sir, yours,

(Signed)

FREDERICK,

Commander in Chief.

Gen. Sir David Dundas, K. B.

The Board met this day at the Judge Advocate General's Office, when the said letter having been read, they agreed that the following questions should be put to each of the Members of the Board:—

<p>APPROVE.</p> <p>Lt.-Gen. Nicolls Lt.-Gen. Sir G. Nugent Earl of Pembroke Lord Heathfield General Craig Gen. Sir D. Dundas</p>	<p>{ Do you, or do you not approve of the Armistice as con- cluded on the 22d of Aug. 1808, in the relative situa- tion of the two armies? }</p>	<p>DISAPPROVE.</p> <p>Earl of Moira.</p>
<p>APPROVE.</p> <p>Lt.-Gen. Sir G. Nugent Gen. Lord Heathfield General Craig Gen. Sir D. Dundas</p>	<p>{ Do you, or do you not approve of the Convention as con- cluded upon the 31st of Aug. 1808, in the relative si- tuation of the two armies? }</p>	<p>DISAPPROVE.</p> <p>Lt.-Gen. Nicolls Earl of Pembroke Earl of Moira</p>

(Signed)

DAVID DUNDAS, President.

My reason for considering the Armistice as advisable, on the 22d of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire after the battle of the 21st, and take up a strong defensive position.

OL. NICOLLS, L. G.

I think, considering the great increase of our force from the first suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the Convention, added to the defeat the enemy had suffered, Sir Hew Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourable terms.

OL. NICOLLS, L. G.

I approve of the Armistice after a due consideration of the relative situations of the two armies on the evening of the 22d of August, but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the Convention, after a due consideration of the relative situation of the two armies at that time; because it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negotiation, sufficient stress was laid upon the great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former successful operations of the British army in the field, from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it; subsequent to the commencement of the negotiation, from the cause in which the British army was engaged being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the goodwill, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and, also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to me, was manifested by General Junot to enter into negotiation, and by the French negotiator to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construction as Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a difference of interpretation. I therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that if less favourable terms to the French army had been insisted upon, they would have been acceded to.

PEMBROKE, Lieutenant-General.

I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the Convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the Officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful.

duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation.

An Armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it. But as the Armistice involved, and in fact established, the whole principle of the Convention, I cannot separate it from the latter.

Sir Arthur Wellesley has stated, that he considered his force, at the commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Acland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to conceive that the prospects which Sir Arthur Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed.

It is urged, that, had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British Generals; namely, sending succours into Spain.

This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls "the critical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that General has been pressed by the British army; and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any other representation give ground to suppose, that Junot could have contemplated

the measure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from his sending the very morning after the battle of Vimiera, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource.

It appears in evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts, a considerable proportion were of very doubtful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad. To the British Generals it was known, when the Armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under Sir John Moore, as well as the 3d and 42d regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation.

The disparity of force and of circumstances was, then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not admit advertence to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But, putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruinous to an army where cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Cascaes were to be got ashore in the bays of the Rock of Lisbon. The question then comes to this: whether the Convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed in the expedition? If it did not, it was not what His Majesty was entitled to expect from the relative situation of the two armies.

I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition.— Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it

must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the Convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.

Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the possibility of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that, notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seem to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea; because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the Convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts.

The Convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, appears to me inapplicable. No object beyond the dislodgment of the French from Egypt was there in question. In the present instance, the operation of the Convention upon the affairs of Spain was a consideration of primary interest; and in that

view, the inevitable effect of some of the articles offers itself to my mind as liable to material objection.

I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable Officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I must conscientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the Convention.

MOIRA, General.

December 27, 1808.

THE END.

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